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SOLVING BATSON

TANIA TETLOW*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court faced an important ideological choice when it
banned the racial use of peremptory challenges in Batson v. Kentucky. The Court could either ground the rule in equality rights
designed to protect potential jurors from stereotyping, or it could base
the rule on the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an “impartial
jury” drawn from a “fair cross-section of the community.” By choosing the equal protection analysis, the Court turned away from the
defendant and the fair functioning of the criminal justice system,
and instead focused on protecting potential jurors. In doing so, the
Court built a fatal error into the Batson rule, a doctrine which has
failed to meaningfully reform jury selection.
This Article proposes to revisit that fork in the road, and for the
first time, to describe how a Sixth Amendment test would function
far better in comparison to the present rule. Unlike Batson, a Sixth
Amendment test would focus on the impact of jury selection on
diversity instead of attempting to divine the subjective intent of
lawyers. The test would function as follows: If peremptory challenges
skewed the diversity of suspect classifications on the jury, then a
lawyer would need to justify his strikes with reference to specific and
individualized concerns about each juror’s impartiality. The judge
would then balance the strength of the proffered reason for the strike
against the value of the lost diversity. Although this remains a
* Associate Provost for International Affairs, Felder-Fayard Associate Professor, Tulane
Law School; J.D., magna cum laude, Harvard Law School; and former Assistant United States
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Werhan, and Claire Dickerson for their helpful commentary, and to Alexandra Fleszar for her
excellent and tireless research assistance.
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subjective test, it would prove much stronger than the Batson rule.
Pragmatically, the test would measure the relevance and importance
of a proffered reason rather than its sincerity, and would prove far
less insulting to enforce. Ideologically, the test would focus on the
more important constitutional goals of the diversity and impartiality
of the jury. Instead of vainly regulating the color blindness of jury
selection, a Sixth Amendment rule would focus on gathering as diverse a jury as possible while rooting out individual bias.
This would require reversal of the Court’s reasoning in Batson, a
decision that would greatly improve equal protection law. Scholars
divided between the worlds of constitutional and criminal law rarely
place the Batson cases into an equal protection context and thus fail
to recognize that those cases prove outliers in their insistence on
absolute color blindness. Stranger still, each side of the Court
switched positions in the jury cases on the value of diversity, on
whether race can predict belief, and on whether racial stereotyping
standing alone causes constitutional injury. This Article argues that
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment as
valuing diversity, and indeed requiring a jury drawn from a “fair
cross-section of the community,” creates a constitutional right for
defendants that trumps color blindness. Jury discrimination has
plagued our criminal justice system for too long to settle for the
Court’s current state of denial. As mandated by the Constitution, we
should focus on the quest for an impartial jury, not just a color-blind
selection process.
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INTRODUCTION
Juries embody the best and the worst of human instinct. The
word “human,” after all, signifies both compassion and weakness.1
Juries represent the collective wisdom of the masses, acting with
justice and mercy while exerting democratic control over our
criminal justice system. But juries also make mistakes—convicting
the innocent and acquitting the guilty for the wrong reasons.2 Worst
of all, juries too often act based on racism and sexism endemic in
our society.3 This discrimination is almost impossible to root out
after a verdict is rendered, so instead, courts and scholars have tried
for more than a century to prevent biased deliberations by regulating the process of jury selection.4 Judges and lawyers strike
potential jurors to keep the worst bigots away, and we attempt to
choose a jury drawn from a “fair cross-section of the community.”5
1. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 604 (11th ed. 2003) (defining human
as “susceptible to or representative of the sympathies and frailties of human nature”).
2. See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011). Although juries may acquit the guilty for many legitimate
reasons, for example when the government has not met its burden of proof, I have argued
elsewhere that juries violate the Constitution when they acquit based on race or gender
discrimination against the victims of crimes. Tania Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittal, 18 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 75 (2009) (describing the ongoing history of jury discrimination through
devaluing minority victims and punishing victims of gender-based violence).
3. See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997); David C. Baldus
et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience,
74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983); Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to Be
Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 439-40 (1988); Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge:
Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13-32 (1990) (outlining the history of “justice” for African Americans);
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016,
1017-25 (1988); Tetlow, supra note 2, at 82-84 (describing the history of jury discrimination
against black victims after the end of the Civil War and during the Civil Rights Era).
4. See generally Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial
Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 830-37 (1997); Michael J. Klarman, The Racial
Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48 (2000).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012). First, the Court interprets the Sixth Amendment requirement
of an “impartial jury” to guarantee a jury venire that represents a fair “cross-section of the
community.” Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). The venire can no longer exclude
women and minorities, as it once did. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 504 (1972); Ballard v.
United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195-96 (1946). Next, the trial judge oversees the questioning of
potential jurors designed to uncover any potential biases. This is a procedural right, rather
than a constitutional one, and the scope of voir dire depends almost entirely on the discretion
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The debates on these subjects have been the source of many criminal appeals and a copious number of law review articles, most of
which, I argue, have strayed off course. The current debate strangely focuses on the rights of potential jurors to a color-blind process,
instead of focusing on the rights of defendants to an impartial jury.6
It focuses on the public’s perception of a fair system rather than an
actually fair system.7 Too often it measures impartiality solely
through diversity, instead of recognizing diversity as a tool to obtain
impartiality, not a goal unto itself.8
The Constitution clearly establishes the goal of an “impartial”
jury in the Sixth Amendment.9 And in the 1986 decision Batson v.
Kentucky, the Court faced a stark fork in the road of how best to
serve that goal once it banned the racial use of peremptory challenges, a practice which had resulted in the elimination of minorities from too many juries.10 The Court could have based its decision
on Sixth Amendment fair cross-section doctrine and regulated jury
selection in a way that valued and protected racial diversity.
Instead, the Court chose to base its decision on equal protection
of the judge. Under equal protection doctrine, however, the Supreme Court only guarantees
the defendant a right to voir dire about racism if race will clearly be an issue in the trial.
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1976). Based on the information elicited during voir
dire, the parties can challenge jurors “for cause,” and the judge may dismiss the most
obviously biased jurors. Next, the prosecutor and defense exercise peremptory challenges to
eliminate the jurors they each perceive to be the least favorable to their side. FED. R. CRIM.
P. 24(b).
6. See infra Part I.A. This begs the question of my own definition of “impartiality.” As
described below, the cases divide between a definition of impartiality as an “on/off switch,” or
as an aspirational and elusive goal, subject to all of the normal partiality born of human
experience. See supra Part III.A. I believe in the latter definition. To pretend that impartiality
is easily determined and fairly common ignores the complexities of human bias. But although
impartiality remains psychologically and legally hard to define, it should remain our goal. See
discussion infra Part I.B.
7. See infra Part II.C.
8. See infra Part III.A.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Supreme Court applied the Sixth Amendment to the
states in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The Sixth Amendment applies by its
terms to criminal trials, not to civil trials, though Congress and the states could impose the
requirement statutorily on civil trials.
10. 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (banning racial use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors).
The defendant in Batson preserved both Sixth Amendment and equal protection grounds on
appeal. Brief for Petitioner at 1, Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (No. 84-6263). The Supreme Court did
not comment on these Sixth Amendment arguments in Batson, but considered and rejected
them by a narrow majority in Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478 (1990).
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reasoning in a way that denied the very relevance of race to jury
selection.11
The Court attempted to solve the problem of discrimination by
jurors by changing the subject to discrimination against jurors. In
the Batson v. Kentucky line of cases, the Court forbade the lawyers
choosing a jury from considering the race or gender of jurors when
exercising peremptory challenges.12 The rule does not aim to protect
jury diversity; indeed, the Supreme Court reasoned that the race
and gender of jurors is irrelevant to the jury’s decision making.13 We
should not therefore be surprised that the rule does not work
particularly well to preserve jury diversity.14 Nor did the Court
make more than a passing attempt to connect such color-blind regulation to the rights of the defendant.15 Instead, the Court elevated
the interests of potential jurors against stereotyping during jury
11. See Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement,
Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1807, 1818-19 (1993). As discussed below in
Parts II.B. and II.C, the cases also present a strange flip-flop for both sides of the Court, with
the liberals arguing for color blindness and avidly denying the relevance of race or gender to
predict belief, and the conservatives arguing the importance of racial and gender diversity to
deliberations.
12. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 148 (1994) (banning gendered use of
peremptory challenges); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (banning racial use of
peremptory challenges by defense lawyers); see Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (banning racial use of
peremptory challenges by prosecutors).
13. See infra Part II.C.
14. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 268 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Given the
inevitably clumsy fit between any objectively measurable standard and the subjective
decisionmaking at issue, I am not surprised to find studies and anecdotal reports suggesting
that, despite Batson, the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges remains a problem.”);
David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal
and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 52-53, 73 n.197 (2001) (describing an
empirical study of capital trials in Philadelphia between 1981 and 1997 in which prosecutors
disproportionately struck black jurors and defense counsel disproportionately struck white
jurors, and race-based uses of prosecutorial peremptories declined by only 2 percent after
Batson); Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection and Jury Selection: Denying
that Race Still Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 511, 583-89 (concluding that Batson challenges are
rarely successful); Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About
Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 462-64 (1996) (finding lower
rates of success using Batson challenges when peremptories were used to strike white
potential jurors as opposed to black); Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory Challenge Accused of
Race or Gender Discrimination? Some Data from One County, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 695,
698-99 (1999) (describing a study in which prosecutors excused 71 percent of black jurors and
defense counsel excused 81 percent of white jurors in one North Carolina county).
15. See infra Part II.C.

1866

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1859

selection above consideration of the defendant’s right to a nondiscriminatory verdict.16 As Susan Herman has argued, the Batson line
of cases is “a story whose author has become so preoccupied with the
fate of peripheral characters that the protagonist has been forgotten.”17 We treat the Batson rule as our primary protection against
jury discrimination, but it has nothing to do with rooting out bias
from juries.18
A growing number of reformers would throw their hands up at
the jury selection process and end the use of peremptory challenges
altogether.19 If we came closer to a system of random selection, they
argue, we would end up with far more racially diverse juries. For
them, the benefits of diversity far outweigh the costs of giving up a
lawyer’s chance to root out bias with peremptory challenges. Some
of these scholars make the pragmatic argument that, in our heterogeneous society, diversity serves as the best available protector of
impartiality.20 Lawyers’ amateurish attempts to use dueling peremptory challenges and root out bias can never compare to the
benefits of a diverse jury, particularly one that is racially diverse. A
few scholars, however, go farther and argue that diversity simply
trumps impartiality.21 For them, juries serve a democratic role and
should represent the public, and minorities should have rights to
proportional representation in the same way that we avoid vote
dilution in legislative districts.22 Under this vision, jury verdicts are

16. See John J. Francis, Peremptory Challenges, Grutter, and Critical Mass: A Means of
Reclaiming the Promise of Batson, 29 VT. L. REV. 297, 310 (2005) (arguing that Batson
subordinates the defendant’s more important rights to liberty and due process to the equal
protection rights of jurors); Herman, supra note 11, at 1815 (“This increasing degree of
attention to the problem of access would be welcome if the cases did not also reveal a
decreasing level of attention to the problem of prejudice.”).
17. Herman, supra note 11, at 1818-19 (explaining that Batson may ensure more black
people can serve as jurors, but it ignores the more important issue of whether defendants still
face discriminatory juries).
18. I have discussed this topic more fully in an earlier work. See Tania Tetlow, Why
Batson Misses the Point, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1713 (2012).
19. See infra Part III.A.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part III.B.
22. Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community
Representation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353 (1999); Francis, supra note 16, at 353-57; see, e.g.,
Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099 (2005).
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neither right nor wrong, but rather expressions of popular sovereignty.
There is a middle ground. We should revisit the fork in the road
and choose the Sixth Amendment over equal protection color
blindness.23 In Sixth Amendment cases before Batson, the Supreme
Court required a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community precisely because the Court understood the value of jury
diversity.24 Applying the Sixth Amendment to jury selection would
allow us to retain peremptory challenges as a tool of impartiality: to
allow lawyers—with expanded voir dire rights—to root out bias as
best they can. But we can provide a much better protection of jury
diversity from the impact of peremptory challenges by actually
valuing jury diversity. A Sixth Amendment approach would allow
the judge to make trade-offs between the use of peremptory challenges to root out individualized bias and protecting the fair cross
section of the jury.
Sixth Amendment regulation would resemble the Batson rule, but
function very differently. In step one of the test, after jury selection
has finished, a lawyer could challenge the other side’s use of peremptory strikes that skewed jury diversity.25 In step two, the
challenged lawyer would have to justify those strikes by articulating
specific concerns about those jurors’ impartiality. Although the
lawyer could not rely on a suspect category as the basis of the strike,
the judge would no longer demand to know whether the thought
crossed the lawyer’s mind that race or gender might predict belief.26
Instead, with an expanded right to voir dire, judges could require
more individualized and particular evidence of bias relevant to the
23. See infra Part II.A.
24. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946); see Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972);
Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
25. Although the Sixth Amendment right belongs only to the defendant, it focuses on
balance for both sides. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 483 (1990). In Part II.A, I argue that
the prosecution would also have rights to enforce this rule in order to achieve a balanced
diversity. This proposal would expand its coverage to all of the categories deemed suspect
under equal protection law but would go no farther. See infra note 32. Although a broader
notion of diversity matters enormously, the regulation of jury diversity requires a limiting
factor in order to function.
26. See infra note 127 (arguing that Batson establishes that requirement though noting
some division in lower courts regarding the permissibility of “dual motives”). As described
below in Part II.A, increasing diversity could not serve as the basis for strikes for the
pragmatic reason that it would vitiate the judge’s authority to protect diversity if both sides
could rely on race alone.
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case.27 Finally, the judge would be tasked with balancing the
lawyer’s concern about bias against the impact on the jury’s overall
diversity.28
The test represents a compromise between our primary tools in
the quest for an impartial jury: peremptory challenges and jury diversity. The test is necessarily subjective because it would give
judges a fair amount of leeway in how they balance diversity and
impartiality. But this test would clearly better protect jury diversity
than the current Batson rule, which in practice bans the protection
of jury diversity.29 A Sixth Amendment rule would avoid the legal
fiction that race and gender do not matter to jury deliberations and
would free judges to actively protect jury diversity.30 Such a rule
would also prove pragmatically easier to enforce because it would
allow judges to measure the strength of a proffered reason for a
strike rather than its sincerity, an awkward and insulting process.31
In this Article, I first describe the ideological trade-offs at stake
in order to explain why a creative solution is necessary. The
Constitution creates, or at least implies, three values relevant to
jury selection: the goal of an impartial jury, the use of jury diversity
as a tool to strive for impartiality, and the more recent requirement
of color-blind jury selection. Although each of these fills an important role, I argue that the quest for impartiality remains the most
important constitutional goal. In Part II, I describe my proposed
Sixth Amendment test in detail and explain why it would protect
diversity while keeping the focus on impartiality as the ultimate
goal.32 Reliance on the Sixth Amendment has been proposed by a
27. I attempt to draw these lines with more specificity in Part II.A, but the proffered
reason would not need to rise to the level of a for-cause challenge.
28. See infra note 32.
29. United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 207-08 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that Batson
forbids district courts from adding and subtracting jurors in order to achieve a racially and
religiously diverse jury).
30. See infra Part II.A.
31. See infra Part II.A.
32. My proposal would regulate only those categories of diversity deemed to be suspect
under equal protection law—namely race, gender, alienage, and national origin. See Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973). I would also include religion, which has an unclear
status under equal protection law, but which is included in a federal statute banning
discrimination in jury selection. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (2012). Circuits are split about the
application of the Batson rule to sexual orientation, but if that is recognized as a suspect
category, it should be included in this analysis as well. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.
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few scholars, but this Article represents the first attempt to explain
why such a test should replace the equal protection rule and why it
would function far better.33 A Sixth Amendment approach would
differentiate between race consciousness and racism in a way that
would allow a focus on diversity (currently banned by the Batson
rule) and better fit within existing equal protection doctrine. In Part
III, I address why peremptory challenges are worth salvaging. A
more diverse jury does not guarantee an impartial one, and we give
away too much by losing the ability to root out the strongest forms
of bias.34 Finally, I address those who prefer random selection in
Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 484 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that equal protection forbids striking
a juror on the basis of sexual orientation and relying on United States v. Windsor for the
application of equal protection); United States v. Blaylock, 421 F.3d 758, 769-70 (8th Cir.
2005) (holding that although the Eighth Circuit and Supreme Court had never extended
Batson’s application to sexual orientation, the prosecutor offered sufficiently neutral
explanations even if a prima facie case had been made).
33. Toni Massaro made this argument before Batson itself was decided. Toni M. Massaro,
Peremptories or Peers? Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64
N.C. L. REV. 501, 542-60 (1986). Several state courts and two federal circuits have also used
Sixth Amendment analysis to ban the racial use of peremptory challenges. Booker v. Jabe, 775
F.2d 762, 779 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom. Michigan v. Booker, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986);
McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1134-35 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986);
People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 762 (Cal. 1978); Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1008 (Del.
1985); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d
499, 518 (Mass. 1979); State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1169-70 (N.J. 1986); State v. Crespin,
612 P.2d 716, 718 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). After Batson, but before Holland v. Illinois, Michael
Kirk argued that the Sixth Amendment should apply alongside equal protection doctrine.
Michael Kirk, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments: The Swain Song of the Racially
Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 821, 839 (1986).
In a Note published after Holland, Jefferson Howeth argued that the Sixth Amendment
analysis should apply because it offered more hope for expanding the Batson rule to defense
attorneys and to civil litigants, though ultimately this results-oriented logic proved moot.
Jefferson Edward Howeth, Note, Holland v. Illinois : The Supreme Court Narrows the Scope
of Protection Against Discriminatory Jury Selection Procedures, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 579,
611, 614 (1991). Susan Herman was the first to criticize the application of equal protection
doctrine to require color blindness. Herman, supra note 11, at 1813-15. She briefly suggests
that a Sixth Amendment approach might have been stronger. Id. at 1840. Finally, Eric Muller
argued that Sixth Amendment regulation of peremptory challenges would actually connect
to the defendant’s rights in a way that Batson does not, though he would retain equal
protection doctrine. Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury
Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 137-48 (1996) (criticizing the
Court’s ruling in Holland, and arguing that a Sixth Amendment rationale could coexist with
the Batson rule). But none of these explain how such a test would work, and even whether the
test would coexist with the Batson rule.
34. Using Susan Herman’s distinction between weak bias (the kind of subjectivity we all
share) and strong bias (the inability to be fair), Herman, supra note 11, at 1823, I argue in
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order to guarantee a representative jury as part of our democratic
system. Equating jury verdicts to elections loses sight of the
fundamental role of a jury in our criminal justice system, which is
to come up with an accurate and legally correct verdict, not merely
the representative one.
We need to refocus our efforts to reform jury selection on the
primary goal of seeking justice for the defendant. We need to focus
on the quest for impartial juries capable of delivering fair verdicts.
The rights of third parties such as jurors matter enormously, but
they cannot trump the role of the jury as a mechanism of justice.
Nor can the power we give citizens to participate in democracy
through juries supersede the functional role that juries play in our
criminal justice system. We should replace Batson with a test that
regulates jury selection in order to seek an impartial jury, without
the fundamental distraction of color blindness.
I. THE DILEMMA OF JURY SELECTION
Discussions of juries too often fail to acknowledge our lack of
consensus on their very purpose. Scholars disagree about whether
the primary point of the jury system is democracy and popular sovereignty—in which case juries should be diverse and representative
of the public—or whether juries function primarily as fact finders
and decision makers—in which case juries should be impartial
above all.35 We disagree about whether to prioritize the rights of
potential jurors, as the Batson rule does, or the rights of defendants.36 We disagree about whether we should ban lawyers from
selecting a jury with any consideration of race or gender, or whether
we should monitor the diversity of the jury precisely because race
and gender do matter.37 Worse yet, we often conflate these goals
Part III that we should not give up on the role of peremptory challenges in seeking out strong
biases that range from the racism all too endemic in our system, see KENNEDY, supra note 3,
to the broad array of experiences or ideas that make it difficult for a juror to listen, consider,
and deliberate fairly over the evidence.
35. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY
122-25 (1994) (describing the Supreme Court’s move from consideration of the fair crosssection requirement to promote impartiality to a focus on the political function of the jury).
36. See Muller, supra note 33, at 118-19.
37. Id.
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without recognizing that they sometimes overlap and sometimes
conflict. Let me begin by describing the constitutional goals of jury
selection and making an argument that the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of an impartial jury matters most.
A. Competing Goals: Impartiality, Diversity, and Color Blindness
Three ideological goals emerge from the analysis of jury selection,
each of which has constitutional roots: impartiality, diversity, and
color blindness. First, we have the Constitution’s explicit textual
guarantee of an “impartial jury” in the Sixth Amendment.38 Second,
the Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment to
encourage a diverse jury, drawn from a fair “cross-section of the
community” because diversity improves the quality of deliberations
and decreases the risks of bias.39 Most recently in the Batson line of
cases, the Supreme Court interpreted the Equal Protection Clause
to require color-blind jury selection, banning lawyers from thinking
about race or gender while choosing the jury.40
Rarely do those who struggle over jury selection acknowledge and
articulate these three separate goals, too often conflating them
without explanation. A racially diverse jury does not necessarily
equate to an impartial jury, for example, though the two concepts
are often used interchangeably.41 Even more rarely do judges and
scholars acknowledge that the three goals sometimes conflict.
Color-blind jury selection, for example, does not necessarily lead to
jury diversity and indeed can stand in its way.42 Or, to use another
example, if we prioritize diversity above all else, we may choose a
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
39. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946); see Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 500
(1972). This is diversity in the broadest sense, though the Court focused on protecting suspect
categories like race and gender. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 191 (1946).
40. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 148 (1994) (banning the gendered use of
peremptory challenges); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (banning the racial use
of peremptory challenges by defense lawyers); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99-100 (1986)
(banning the racial use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors).
41. See, e.g., Brand, supra note 14 (describing diverse juries as the ultimate goal); Muller,
supra note 33, at 106-07 (describing the popular perception of racial diversity as a measure
of jury impartiality).
42. See Tetlow, supra note 18, at 1720-27 (stating that lawyers and judges are not
currently allowed to use race-based peremptory challenges, even to increase diversity).
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jury that looks fair over a jury that is in fact fair. I begin here by
demonstrating the trade-offs among these three goals inherent in
our choices about jury selection before describing my own proposal
for balancing them.
Let me make a fairly innocuous-sounding point that directly
challenges much of the current orthodoxy. I argue that the most
important constitutional goal of jury selection is impartiality. We
should prioritize the rights of defendants to an impartial jury over
the rights of potential jurors to color blindness. And as we prioritize
the search for a fair jury, we should not settle for a jury that looks
fair because it is diverse. The quest for an impartial jury may prove
aspirational, but we cannot forget that it remains our ultimate goal.
The right to an “impartial jury,” after all, is an explicit textual
guarantee contained in the Sixth Amendment.43 The right is designed to protect the basic integrity of the entire criminal justice
process.44 Although we have many important goals for our criminal
justice system, including promoting democracy and self-governance,
our main concern must remain the trial’s actual fairness.45 As I
argue in more detail below, we should strive for jury verdicts that
are legally and factually accurate, not just verdicts that express the
public will.46 Ideally, juries will convict only the guilty and convict
only when the government has met its burden of proof.47 And they
will not refuse to convict out of racial or gender animus toward the
victim.48
43. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
44. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 483 (1990) (“The rule we announce today is not only
the only plausible reading of the text of the Sixth Amendment, but we think it best furthers
the Amendment’s central purpose as well. Although the constitutional guarantee runs only
to the individual and not to the State, the goal it expresses is jury impartiality with respect
to both contestants: neither the defendant nor the State should be favored.”).
45. See infra Part III.B.
46. See infra Part III.B. There are times when it is legally appropriate to acquit a guilty
defendant, because, for example, the government has not met its burden of proof. But there
remain clearly incorrect verdicts, such as the conviction of the factually innocent or the refusal
to convict a guilty defendant because of bias against the victim.
47. There are also times when applying facts to a subjective area of law allows for a range
of “correct” verdicts. See infra Part III.B.
48. See Carter, supra note 3, at 428 (discussing the failure of jurors to imagine blacks as
victims in the context of the Bernard Goetz acquittal and McCleskey v. Kemp); Daniel
Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the
Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1325 n.25 (1997) (stating that “there is no legal
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To accomplish this, we do not seek the mythical “impartial juror”
devoid of opinions and untouched by individual experience—a blank
slate. Rather, we seek an impartial jury as a whole, a group made
up of individuals fair enough to listen to the evidence and to deliberate thoughtfully.49 We seek a group containing enough variety of life
experiences to add to the richness of understanding of the case and
to deliberations.50
In a series of cases in the mid-twentieth century, the Court began
exploring the importance of jury diversity to our notions of fairness.
The Court interpreted the explicit right to an “impartial jury” to
guarantee a jury drawn from a fair “cross-section of the community.”51 In the broadest sense, the Court reasoned, diversity of viewpoints helps lead us to correct decisions.52 Juries are not black boxes

literature dealing with acquittals”); Tetlow, supra note 2, at 79 (arguing that jury
discrimination against victims based on race or gender is endemic and unconstitutional). The
Second Circuit mentioned the issue in dicta in United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 608 (2d
Cir. 1997) (considering “whether a juror’s intent to convict or acquit regardless of the evidence
constitutes a basis for the juror’s removal during the course of deliberations under Rule
23(b)”).
49. See Richard M. Re, Re-Justifying the Fair Cross Section Requirement: Equal
Representation and Enfranchisement in the American Criminal Jury, 116 YALE L.J. 1568,
1574 (2007) (distinguishing between a “single-viewpoint” argument that asserts the need for
a particular perspective in jury deliberations versus a “multiple-viewpoint” perspective that
looks for an “array of dissimilar views that enrich the quality of deliberations”).
50. Id.
51. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). The Court used the Sixth Amendment
to ban the outright exclusion of black people in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310
(1879), and women from jury service in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533 (1975), though
the Court stopped short of regulating the cross section of the actual trial jury. Holland v.
Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1990) (refusing to apply Sixth Amendment analysis to govern
the fair cross section of the petit jury). These cases focus on the rights of the defendant to such
diversity, and do not simply protect the rights of various groups to serve on juries. In both
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531-32, and Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 370 (1979), for example, the
Court struck down jury systems in which female jurors were not excluded but could
voluntarily opt out or had to affirmatively opt in to serve. Because women could choose to
serve, those cases necessarily focused on the rights of defendants to have women fairly
represented. Scott W. Howe, Juror Neutrality or an Impartiality Array? A Structural Theory
of the Impartial Jury Mandate, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1173, 1207-08 (1995).
52. See Muller, supra note 33, at 144 (“[C]riminal verdicts are not just findings of
historical fact, but expressions of an inescapably subjective consensus reached among jurors
who bring discrete viewpoints and perspectives to their deliberations. Representation of these
discrete viewpoints on the jury enhances the reliability of the criminal verdict, both by
guaranteeing that the verdict will reflect a true social consensus, and by convincing the
community as a whole that the verdict is worthy of respect.”).
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taking in evidence and producing a scientific verdict,53 but rather
rely on the ability of individuals from very different backgrounds to
perceive the elusive truth.54 We value consensus reached from a
variety of perspectives, which is why our system often vests important decisions to groups: from juries to panels of appellate judges to
legislatures. The very nature of a jury implies a multiplicity of
viewpoints.55 The jury is thus collectively impartial, balancing the
inevitable and inherent biases of each individual.56
In Sixth Amendment cases, the Court recognized the value of
diversity very broadly, but focused on regulating categories subject
to heightened equal protection scrutiny. The Court described the
particular importance of black people and women to jury diversity
without pretending to know how such jurors would vote.57 The Court
argued only that deliberations would be impoverished without those
perspectives.58
And although the Court stopped short of making specific claims
about the value of diversity, empirical evidence shows that racially
53. Id. at 126-32 (arguing that, in the Batson cases, the Court implied with its color-blind
logic that juries deliberate and make a scientific evaluation of evidence to produce a
presumably correct verdict).
54. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946); see also Re, supra note 49,
at 1574.
55. See Holland, 493 U.S. at 493-94 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the very nature
of a jury implies the opportunity for a fair cross section of the community). The Supreme
Court has defined a minimum number of jurors to make up a constitutionally acceptable jury
as a group “large enough to promote group deliberation, free from outside attempts at
intimidation, and to provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of
the community.” Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); see also Apodaca v. Oregon, 406
U.S. 404, 410-11 (1972) (plurality opinion) (“[A] jury will come to such a [common sense]
judgment as long as it consists of a group of laymen representative of a cross section of the
community who have the duty and the opportunity to deliberate ... on the question of a
defendant’s guilt.”).
56. Jeffrey Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 125, 129-34;
Howe, supra note 51, at 1191; Re, supra note 49, at 1574-75 (describing this “multipleviewpoint” conception of diversity as a “diffused impartiality”).
57. For an in-depth description of the development of the fair cross section rule and how
it morphed into later interest group politics, see ABRAMSON, supra note 35.
58. See Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193-94 (“[I]t is not enough to say that women when sitting
as jurors neither act nor tend to act as a class.... The truth is that the two sexes are not
fungible; a community made up exclusively of one is different from a community composed of
both; the subtle interplay of influence one on the other is among the imponderables. To
insulate the courtroom from either may not in a given case make an iota of difference. Yet a
flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded.” (footnotes omitted)).
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diverse juries are less likely to engage in discrimination.59 The
presence of a key number of minority jurors seems to help shift the
potential bias of white jurors.60 Gender, though less salient than
race, also correlates to different experiences and resulting beliefs.
For example, studies have found that female jurors are more likely
to convict in a hypothetical rape trial and female jurors have
expressed greater certainty about rape convictions in real trials.61
Meanwhile, the Court’s efforts to ban exclusion of various groups
from the jury venire meant little when lawyers could still skew that
diversity during the selection of the trial jury.62 At this point, the
Supreme Court faced a crossroads between the Sixth Amendment
and the Equal Protection Clause. On one hand, it could apply the
Sixth Amendment to govern the diversity of the trial jury, as I now
propose.63 Without creating a quota system, the Court could regulate
the use of peremptory challenges to skew the diversity of the petit
jury from the diversity of the venire by requiring some level of

59. See generally Mark Cammack, In Search of the Post-Positivist Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 405,
427 (1995) (finding that experiential learning is key to perspective and deliberation); Francis,
supra note 16, at 327-30, 334-35 (conducting empirical research on the importance of diversity
to deliberations); Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the
Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 75-107 (1993) (collecting empirical data).
60. See, e.g., Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical
Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 683, 692 (2001) (finding
different thresholds of minority participation for successful influence on acquittal or
conviction).
61. See James H. Davis et al., Victim Consequences, Sentence Severity, and Decision
Processes in Mock Juries, 18 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 346, 354 (1977);
Gloria J. Fischer, Gender Effects on Individual Verdicts and on Mock Jury Verdicts in a
Simulated Acquaintance Rape Trial, 36 SEX ROLES 491, 496-97 (1997); Norbert L. Kerr et al.,
Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Effects of Concept Definition and Assigned Decision Rule
on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 282, 290 (1976);
Michael G. Rumsey & Judith M. Rumsey, A Case of Rape: Sentencing Judgments of Males and
Females, 41 PSYCHOL. REP. 459, 462 (1977).
62. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91-93 (1986). In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
221-22 (1965), the Court held that although the Equal Protection Clause placed some limits
on the government’s exercise of peremptory challenges, the defendant must show the state’s
repeated striking of black jurors across multiple cases. The Batson Court recognized this as
a “crippling burden” that rendered the prosecution’s peremptory challenges immune from constitutional scrutiny. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93.
63. The Court declined to follow that road in Batson without comment, and then explicitly
considered and rejected it a few years later in Holland v. Illinois 493 U.S. 474 (1990). See
discussion infra Part II.B.
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justification for peremptory challenges.64 Instead, in Batson v.
Kentucky, the Court applied the Equal Protection Clause to ban
prosecutors from considering race when selecting a jury.65 Batson
did not concern itself with the ultimate diversity of the jury; instead,
it regulated the intentions of the lawyers choosing the jury.66 The
Batson rule required color-blind jury selection to protect potential
jurors, and the public as a whole, from racial stereotypes.67 The
Court thus made a remarkable shift away from discrimination by
jurors to focus on discrimination against jurors.68
The Batson line of cases seemed to ignore, or sometimes even to
reject, both of the Court’s other constitutional goals.69 The Court
denied its earlier logic that race and gender diversity matter to jury
deliberations.70 Instead, the Court reasoned that the race and gender of a juror can have no impact on deliberations, and to believe
otherwise during the exercise of peremptory challenges violates the
Constitution.71 Empirical evidence proving that race and gender in
fact predict voting behavior was dismissed as “conjured up.”72 The
64. This is the test I propose. See infra Part II.A.
65. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (forbidding prosecutors to use peremptory challenges based
upon the race of the juror).
66. See Herman, supra note 11, at 1824-25.
67. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87-88. Although Batson claimed also to protect the rights of the
defendant, its reasoning was entirely divorced from the rights of the defendant. See Muller,
supra note 33, at 102-05.
68. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. In later cases, the Court expanded this ruling to peremptories motivated by gender in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994), and
applied the rule to defense counsel in Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992). Justice
Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion to J.E.B., noting that the majority’s reasoning denying the
relevance of gender to jury selection contradicted Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. J.E.B., 511
U.S. at 157 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Deborah L. Forman, What Difference Does It Make?
Gender and Jury Selection, 2 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 35, 55 (1992) (noting the conflict between
Sixth Amendment and equal protection jurisprudence on whether gender matters); Muller,
supra note 33, at 98-100, 103 (noting the striking contrast between the Court’s Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence, which suggests that difference matters, and Batson’s pretending
that it does not); Case Comment, Fair Cross-Section Requirement for Juries—Peremptory
Challenges: Holland v. Illinois, 104 HARV. L. REV. 40, 168-69 (1990) (noting that the Sixth
Amendment encourages what the Equal Protection Clause forbids).
69. See the in-depth discussion of color blindness and Batson in Part II.B-C below.
70. Muller, supra note 33, at 97-107; Tetlow, supra note 18, at 1720.
71. See Herman, supra note 11, at 1825 (“In the Court’s utopian colorblind world,
defendants would have no reason to care about the race of jurors because the jurors themselves would be colorblind.”).
72. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 138 n.9.
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Court equated race consciousness with racism, and deemed it
irrational, unconstitutional, and necessarily deriving from “open
hostility or from some hidden and unarticulated fear.”73 The Court
also relied on the rather circular logic that the idea that race and
gender matter to jury deliberations is “the very stereotype the law
condemns.”74 The Court does not want race or gender to matter, so
it pretends that they do not.
The best demonstration of the difference between the Court’s
color-blind logic versus its earlier celebration of diversity lies in the
Court’s changing definition of impartiality. In the Sixth Amendment
cases, the Court defined impartiality as something aspirational and
collective.75 In the Batson line of cases, however, the Court presented impartiality as something knowable, common, and easily determined.76 Each individual juror either is impartial or is not impartial—an on/off switch.77 If we define impartiality as merely being
“qualified,” then race and gender cannot have anything to do with
it.78
I would prioritize the vision of impartiality of the Sixth Amendment cases—the elusive goal rather than the on/off switch. Every
potential juror brings his or her own subjective bias born of human
experience.79 The reason we value group deliberation and decision
making is to balance those perspectives and to increase the likelihood of a better result.80 The goal of impartiality may prove
73. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991).
74. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991).
75. Massaro, supra note 33, at 543-45. Race and gender matter, not intrinsically, but as
an incredibly salient human experience. Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or
Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1201, 1205-06 (1992); see ABRAMSON, supra note 35, at 119-20.
76. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 142-44, 146; Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992);
Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 630-31; Powers, 499 U.S. at 410; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87
(1986).
77. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 410 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 87); Muller, supra note 33,
at 123.
78. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (“Just as the Equal Protection Clause forbids the States to
exclude black persons from the venire on the assumption that blacks as a group are
unqualified to serve as jurors, so it forbids the States to strike black veniremen on the
assumption that they will be biased in a particular case simply because the defendant is
black.” (citation omitted)).
79. See infra Part III.A for a discussion of this definition of impartiality.
80. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting); Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961).
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aspirational, and its quest difficult, but that does not make the goal
any less primary. My proposal to regulate jury selection would make
use of diversity to balance the inherent subjectivity of jurors and to
strive for a more impartial whole.81
Diversity alone, however, is no substitute for impartiality. We
cannot merely balance a wide array of perspectives because all juror
bias is not created equally. Susan Herman differentiates between
weak bias, the innate subjectivity that can never be eliminated, only
balanced, versus strong bias, the inability to be fair.82 To prioritize
diversity above all, especially by eliminating peremptory challenges,
leaves too much strong bias on the jury.83 In Part II, I attempt to
thread the needle between these two goals to balance the use of
diversity to achieve a broad spectrum of human experience with the
power for parties to root out strong bias. In Part III, I defend the
attempt to preserve peremptory challenges at all.
B. Applying Theory to Practice
Applying the competing constitutional goals I have identified to
the actual process of jury selection demonstrates the pragmatic
dilemmas we face. Fundamentally, there is no way to simultaneously value each of the three goals. Instead, we have to juggle three
balls with two hands.
Jury trials begin with the process of voir dire. We ask a pool of
potential jurors questions about themselves, some quite personal,
in order to uncover potential bias.84 The scope of voir dire falls
within the broad discretion of the trial judges, who often have very
81. Again, my proposal would regulate only those categories of diversity deemed to be
suspect under equal protection law, namely race, gender, national origin, and religion. See
supra note 32. This would be further limited by the fact that a party would need to care
enough about a particular category of diversity in order to bring a challenge. Some categories
will not seem relevant to the parties. See infra Part II.A.1.
82. Herman, supra note 11, at 1823. There is a difference, for example, between a juror
who tends to respect law enforcement versus a juror who believes that cops never lie, or
between a juror with a healthy distrust of police born of experience versus a juror who
believes that every cop always lies about every subject.
83. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 207 (1989).
84. See Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection:
The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed
Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150-51 (2010).
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different ideas about whether voir dire constitutes a time-consuming and intrusive process not necessary to distinguish among
presumably good people, or whether voir dire is the most important
part of a jury selection process designed to root out racism and any
other factors that might cloud a juror’s judgment.85 Broad voir dire,
I argue, makes the quest for impartiality meaningful and deters us
from relying merely on the most superficial of information about
jurors.86
State courts vary enormously, but often give lawyers wide permission to individually question jurors about any issue that seems
relevant.87 In federal court, however, judges themselves usually
conduct the entire voir dire and do so in a far more limited way.88
Questions might be limited to asking jurors’ occupations, neighborhoods, relationships to the parties or lawyers, or whether they or
close family members have been victims of crimes or charged with
crimes.89 This might then be topped off with perfectly useless group
questions such as: “Does anyone think they cannot be fair?”90
85. See Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431-32 (1991) (upholding a defendant’s conviction despite the refusal of the trial judge to allow thorough voir dire about the jury’s exposure
to pretrial publicity); see also Bennett, supra note 84, at 158-60; Jay M. Spears, Note, Voir
Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges,
27 STAN. L. REV. 1493, 1494 (1975).
86. See Tania Tetlow, Granting Prosecutors Constitutional Rights to Combat Discrimination, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1117, 1151-58 (2012) (arguing for a broader right to voir dire).
87. See Bennett, supra note 84, at 159 (stating that federal courts generally allow less
lawyer involvement than state courts); Roger Allan Ford, Modeling the Effects of Peremptory
Challenges on Jury Selection and Jury Verdicts, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 377, 386 (2010) (noting the number of potential factors under judicial discretion); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a)(1)
(“The court may examine prospective jurors or may permit the attorneys for the parties to do
so.”); Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594 (1976) (“Voir dire ‘is conducted under the supervision
of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion.’” (quoting
Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413 (1895))); Anne M. Payne & Christine Cohoe, Jury
Selection and Voir Dire in Criminal Cases, 76 AM. JUR. TRIALS 127, § 4 (2000) (“Most states
give trial counsel broad discretion in questioning prospective jurors.”).
88. See Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Justice & Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 659, 67475 (2002) (arguing that using only basic and limited questions in a “cursory process at best”
is likely due to judicial desire for efficiency, but has the negative consequence that very little
information is provided in order to root out biased jurors and provide as close to an impartial
jury as possible). In other cases, judges (and lawyers) probe deeper into private attitudes and
practices. For example, they sometimes ask about religious beliefs, drinking habits, jobs, hobbies, et cetera. See Alschuler, supra note 83, at 158-59 (complaining about the unnecessarily
intrusive nature of voir dire).
89. See Marder, supra note 88, at 674-75.
90. See Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 451 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“There is no single way to voir
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Lawyers frequently know very little about potential jurors and are
left with what they can observe: dress, demeanor, and, of course,
race and gender.91
In many courts, accordingly, this crucial first step to identifying
biased jurors is far too limited.92 Even as to rooting out racism, the
bias that has most plagued and poisoned our criminal justice
system, lawyers rely on the discretion of trial judges. The Supreme
Court has granted defendants a constitutional right to ask jurors
questions related to racism, but only when there is a “significant
likelihood” that prejudice will likely affect jurors.93 In Turner v.
Murray, the Court held that the imposition of the death penalty on
a black defendant always raises such issues, yet a mere conviction
for murder would not.94 Some members of the Court found it too
divisive as a constitutional matter to presume that race will be an
issue in a criminal trial, and instead argued that raising the issue
of racism might put it in the heads of jurors.95 We are thus left with
the Alice in Wonderland rule that lawyers may neither presume
that the race or gender of a juror matters to the chances that a juror
dire a juror .... [A trial] judge can also evaluate impartiality by explaining the trial processes
and asking general questions about the juror’s commitment to follow the law and the trial
court’s instructions.”).
91. See Marder, supra note 88, at 674-75; see also Ford, supra note 87, at 378; Spears,
supra note 85, at 1507, 1516.
92. See Anna Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors: Disparate Impact and the (Mis)Use of
Batson, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1359, 1390 (2012) (noting the often limited opportunity to
assess each juror); Spears, supra note 85, at 1504-06.
93. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596-98 (1976) (holding that the interracial nature of
the crime did not require voir dire about racial prejudice because “[t]he circumstances thus
did not suggest a significant likelihood that racial prejudice might infect [the defendant’s]
trial”); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 529 (1973) (finding that a known civil rights
activist on trial for marijuana possession had a right to voir dire on racial prejudice). To give
an example of how unduly limited the right remains for defendants, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
a conviction in which white supremacist defendants accused of defacing a synagogue and
assaulting nonwhites in a park were not permitted to voir dire jurors about bias because those
issues were not clearly relevant to the trial. United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1084 (5th
Cir. 1991), aff’d en banc, 968 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1992).
94. 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986). A majority of the Court felt comfortable affirming a murder
conviction despite a refusal to allow voir dire about prejudice against a black defendant,
though the Court did reverse the resulting death penalty. Id. This led to the classic retort
from Justice Brennan: “King Solomon did not, in fact, split the baby in two, and had he done
so, I suspect that he would be remembered less for his wisdom than for his hardheartedness.”
Id. at 44 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95. Id. at 50 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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will be racist or sexist, nor do lawyers have a right to find out if the
juror is actually racist or sexist.
After seeking information about the pool, the lawyers then ask
the judge to strike a few jurors “for cause.”96 Judges generally grant
these strikes sparingly.97 They must meet the rather high standard
of “whether the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair
the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his
instructions and his oath.’ ”98 Judges tend to treat challenges for
cause as a judicial declaration of a citizen’s unfitness for jury service
and therefore grant them reluctantly and rarely.99 Even when faced
with an admission of bias by potential jurors, judges often try to
rehabilitate them by asking leading questions.100 For example, a
judge may ask a juror, “Do you think you could put aside that
opinion and listen to the evidence?”101
Our current jury selection system thus relies instead on peremptory challenges as the primary method to honor the constitutional
guarantee of an “impartial jury.”102 Prosecutors and defense lawyers
try to root out bias using their own inexact instincts.103 By being
96. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985).
97. See Scott Brooks, Comment, Guilty by Reason of Insanity: Why a Maligned Defense
Demands a Constitutional Right of Inquiry on Voir Dire, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1183, 1189
(2013); Spears, supra note 85, at 1500.
98. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424.
99. Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power,” 27 STAN. L. REV.
545, 549-50 (1975); see Maureen A. Howard, Taking the High Road: Why Prosecutors Should
Voluntarily Waive Peremptory Challenges, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 414-15 (2010)
(“Commentators have noted judicial reluctance to grant challenges for cause. This may be
particularly true in jurisdictions where judges are subject to reelection ... [and] some judges
engage in ‘aggressive rehabilitation,’ asking challenged jurors if they could set aside their
experiences and feelings and follow the judge’s orders.”); Karen M. Bray, Comment, Reaching
the Final Chapter in the Story of Peremptory Challenges, 40 UCLA L. REV. 517, 519, 556-57
(1992) (noting the limited scope of for-cause challenges).
100. Howe, supra note 51, at 1186 (describing the process of rehabilitating a juror).
101. I will discuss the possibility of increasing judicial responsibility over jury selection by
making the test more subjective, but doing so hands over the power over jury selection to a
single actor, a proposition that comes with its own obvious risks. See infra Part III.A.2.
102. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 118-21 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (delineating the extensive history of dependence on the peremptory challenge and noting the
fundamental importance of the peremptory right in the criminal justice system); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965); Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894); Lewis v.
United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892).
103. Babcock, supra note 99, at 552 (“Without giving any reason or meeting any legal test,
he may dismiss from ‘his’ jury those he fears or hates the most, so that he is left with ‘a good
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overinclusive in the number of unbiased jurors excused, peremptory
challenges allow the court and lawyers to avoid the hard work of
actually determining specific bias with a greater certainty.104 Many,
if not most, peremptory challenges are admittedly used against
jurors who would be impartial in the broadest sense, but the hope
is that an overinclusive net will prove more likely to catch the most
biased jurors still lurking in the pool.105
Peremptory challenges function not as an individualized attempt
to determine impartiality but rather as an adversarial process that
makes use of each side’s self-interest.106 Lawyers often do not seek
impartiality so much as partiality towards their own side; they
strike the jurors that seem most likely to vote against them.107 The
hope is that these dueling challenges leave us with a jury closest to
the middle.108 Legal scholarship often mocks this approach as
somehow unfair or selfish, at least when used by the prosecutor who
seeks a conviction.109 But like much of our adversarial system, the
opinion of the jury, the want of which might totally disconcert him; the law wills not that he
should be tried by any one man against whom he has conceived a prejudice even without being
able to assign a reason for such dislike.’ ”); see also Spears, supra note 85, at 1507 n.61; cf.
Alschuler, supra note 83, at 203 (“Nevertheless, the available evidence suggests that [trial
lawyers] often fall short of their partisan goals. Their folk wisdom, trial experiences, mystic
intuitions, and crude group stereotypes do not in fact enable them to predict which jurors will
favor their positions.”).
104. See Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose
Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 771 (1992); Spears, supra note 85, at 1507.
105. Underwood, supra note 104, at 771 (“[T]he purpose of the peremptory challenge is the
elimination of bias ... its method is to resolve doubts (up to a specific number) in favor of exclusion. This device has the advantage of saving the time of attorneys, jurors, and the court that
would otherwise be spent in probing the true extent, if any, of the bias of potential jurors. It
accomplishes this result by permitting the exclusion of a substantial number of unbiased
jurors.”).
106. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 120 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“The function of the challenge
is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the
jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed for them,
and not otherwise.” (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965))); Babcock, supra
note 99, at 551.
107. See Babcock, supra note 99, at 551 (“Of course, neither litigant is trying to choose
‘impartial’ jurors, but rather to eliminate those who are sympathetic to the other side,
hopefully leaving only those biased for him.”); Spears, supra note 85, at 1503-04.
108. See Babcock, supra note 99, at 551.
109. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially
Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099, 1104 (1994)
(stating that the use of race or gender as a basis for peremptory challenges would be a “part
of effective advocacy were it not entirely repugnant to the values and standards of the
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approach is designed to harness the advocacy of each side to allow
the system to come to a better result.110
Although a majority of peremptory challenges end up striking
jurors who merely seem less favorable to the lawyer’s cause, peremptories still remain crucial to rooting out jurors truly incapable
of being fair. From jurors motivated by discrimination to those with
a stake in the outcome of the case, there remains strong bias, which
is important to remove from a jury.111 There are jurors whose racism, sexism, or any other prejudices do not allow them to perceive
the truth or do justice, but who will not admit that bias in a way
that subjects them to challenge for cause?112 I do not pretend that
these lines are easy to draw, which is why judges find it impossible
to police them with for-cause challenges; but that does not mean
that they do not exist.113
Indeed the difficulty of defining impermissible levels of bias,
much less identifying and accusing a particular potential juror of
such bias, underlies the need for an overinclusive system of peremptory challenges. Unlike judges, lawyers can strike jurors who do not

Constitution, values that should and do override the litigant’s interest in winning”). Although
prosecutors do have a different ethical role—to seek justice rather than to represent a
client—prosecutors seeking a conviction do so the vast majority of the time because they
sincerely believe in the defendant’s guilt, as well as in protecting the victim and deterring
future crime. Although we must strictly regulate the prosecutor’s obligation to do justice,
demonizing the very notion of a prosecutor does not particularly help.
110. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, The Trouble with Postmodern Zeal, 38 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 63, 64-65 (1996) (discussing the advantages of the adversarial system).
111. See Herman, supra note 11, at 1821-22. Scott Howe attempts to define impermissible
bias (as opposed to unavoidable subjectivity) as “persons who establish themselves in advance
as likely to be strongly influenced by information gained extrajudicially regarding important
factual issues, as likely to decide the case primarily on offensive, personal considerations or
as likely to fail to consider relevant, in-court arguments.” Howe, supra note 51, at 1183.
112. See Roger S. Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 24344 (1968) (“Challenges for cause, therefore, do not keep juries free from unconscious prejudice,
from prejudice which the venireman through embarrassment or otherwise is unwilling to
admit publicly on voir dire, or from prejudice whose impact on his objectivity is greater than
he knows.” (footnote omitted)).
113. See Howe, supra note 51, at 1184 (giving examples of such bias: financial stake in the
outcome of the case, relationship with a party, general bias against the race of a party, the
punishment to be imposed, or the crime itself ). The first two examples would be removable
for cause and hopefully obvious enough to root out; the second two examples would not unless
a juror was aware of them and willing to admit them out loud. Kuhn, supra note 112, at 24344.
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publicly confess to their own biases but still hint at them.114 Wearing a confederate flag while denying any racist beliefs does not
necessarily equate to a predisposition to convict black defendants—
certainly not in a way that a judge could comfortably act on with a
for-cause challenge—but it would constitute a rational, though
admittedly overinclusive, guess on the part of a defense lawyer.115
Our jury selection system thus allows a level of stereotyping
based on categories such as occupation, neighborhood, and class,
which we would find unacceptable elsewhere.116 We have chosen a
process that casts too broad a net precisely because we see the need
to root out bias as so crucial.117 Most importantly, defense attorneys
with minority clients (or prosecutors with minority victims in some
cases) worry about identifying the racism they know is endemic in
our society and thus in our jury pool.118 And because we have at
least reached the point in our history when being accused of racism
is offensive, even when racism itself remains common, having a
114. See Babcock, supra note 99, at 554; Howe, supra note 51, at 1194; Underwood, supra
note 104, at 771.
115. Even in choosing this example, I worried about insulting any less obvious category of
behavior, such as watching Fox News, because of course there is no absolute correlation
between racism and conservatism, and the allegation of racism is insulting. The awkwardness
of this overgeneralizing is precisely what makes for-cause challenges so difficult. If the judge
were to ask about racial attitudes surrounding the flag, there are plenty of possibly legitimate
neutral reasons of southern pride a juror could credibly offer. We give far too much credit to
the process of for-cause challenges by assuming that, even when jurors are aware of their own
racism, they will publicly articulate it. See Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious
Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 161 (2005) (noting that
“[s]ubtle forms of bias are automatic, unconscious, and unintentional” and “escape notice, even
the notice of those enacting the bias” (quoting Susan T. Fiske, What’s in a Category?:
Responsibility, Intent, and the Avoidability of Bias Against Outgroups, in THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF GOOD AND EVIL 127, 127-28 (Arthur G. Miller ed., 2004))). Nor do judges want
to publicly label jurors as racists by granting such challenges. See Babcock, supra note 99, at
553.
116. Albert Alschuler argues that we should eliminate peremptory challenges altogether
because such stereotypes, even on the basis of non-suspect categories, are degrading.
Alschuler, supra note 83, at 209.
117. Babcock, supra note 99, at 556 (“Given the importance of the peremptory challenge,
then, ‘any system that prevents or embarrasses the full, unrestricted exercise of that right of
challenge must be condemned.’ ” (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894))).
118. See Colbert, supra note 3, at 13-32 (outlining the history of “justice” for African
Americans); Ogletree, supra note 109, at 1127-28 (describing the role defense lawyers play in
rooting out racist jurors); Tetlow, supra note 2, at 76-95 (describing the history of discriminatory acquittals in hate crime cases as well as empirical evidence of jurors’ devaluing of
minority victims in murder and rape cases).

2015]

SOLVING BATSON

1885

method that does not demand public articulation of those traits that
correlate to racism matters enormously.119
We allow peremptory challenges for a worthy goal, but they come
with two significant costs. First, they allow lawyers to engage in the
kind of stereotyping that offends us most: that based on race or
gender.120 Second, and more important for most reformers, peremptory challenges allow lawyers to destroy jury diversity.121 The Supreme Court chose to address the first problem by regulating the
intent of lawyers choosing a jury, but it has never addressed the
second: the actual resulting diversity of the jury.122 Indeed, the
Court’s logic in the Batson line of cases calls into question the
relevance of jury diversity at all.123
The Batson test functions as follows: first, one side may challenge
the other side’s use of peremptories to strike a particular race or
119. See Babcock, supra note 99, at 553 (“The peremptory, made without giving any reason,
avoids trafficking in the core of truth in most common stereotypes. It makes unnecessary
explicit entertainment of the idea that there are cases that, for example, most middle-aged
civil servants would be unable to decide on the evidence or that most blacks would not rule
on impartially.”).
120. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986).
121. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222 (1965).
122. Although Batson held that the Equal Protection Clause does not allow lawyers to
strike jurors from the jury venire based on race, 476 U.S. at 79, the Holland Court decided
that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury composed of a fair cross section of the
community is not violated when lawyers use peremptory challenges to strike any remaining
minority jurors from the petit jury. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 487 (1990).
123. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 148-49 (1994) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (describing the Court’s decision to pretend that race and gender do not matter,
though empirical evidence proves otherwise, in order to protect equal protection goals);
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (“And if a litigant believes that
the prospective juror harbors the same biases or instincts, the issue can be explored in a
rational way that consists with respect for the dignity of persons, without the use of classifications based on ancestry or skin color.”); Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political
Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 210 (1995) (“In fact, the two analyses
are in a great deal of tension: whereas the Sixth Amendment ‘flavor’ approach values a
group’s input into the jury process because the group has characteristics that make it different
from other groups in society, the Court’s recent Equal Protection Clause cases deny any relevant differences between the excluded and included groups at all. Use of certain jury selection
criteria is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause reasoning because the criteria are themselves irrelevant, and their use reflects nothing more than stereotypical thinking.” (citing
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 133-34); Muller, supra note 33, at 122-23 (“[T]he Court in Batson and its
progeny has continually and stridently rejected the theory of difference .... This means when
a black woman is removed from the jury because of her race and gender, and is replaced by
a white man, nothing is lost.”).
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gender;124 second, the challenged party must then give a race—or
gender-neutral reason for the strike;125 and third, the judge must
decide whether that reason is pretextual, a fancy word for lying.126
Batson thus asks judges to determine whether lawyers thought
about race or gender when making jury selection decisions.127 The
judge has to measure not the quality of the proffered reason for a
peremptory challenge, or even its plausibility, but rather its sincerity.128 In order to grant a Batson challenge, a judge must make a
finding that the lawyer lied to the court, thus committing an ethics
violation.129
124. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing that litigants remain
free to misuse peremptory challenges as long as the strikes fall below the prima facie
threshold level).
125. Lawyers need only tender a neutral reason, not a “persuasive, or even plausible,” one.
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68 (1995) (per curiam); see also id. at 766 (“[T]he
mustaches and the beards look suspicious to me.”).
126. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98; id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that the
unconscious internalization of racial stereotypes may lead litigants more easily to conclude
“that a prospective black juror is ‘sullen,’ or ‘distant,’ ” even though that characterization
would not have sprung to mind had the prospective juror been white).
127. Batson asks this question by determining whether the race- or gender-neutral reason
offered is pretextual, meaning it is not the real reason for the strike, though technically the
judge does not ask the lawyers whether they considered race or gender. The Supreme Court
has never officially decided whether a dual motive—a permissible motive and an impermissible one—would pass the Batson test. In dissent to a denial of certiorari, two Justices
suggested that it would not. Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 928 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). Some federal circuit courts, however, have applied mixedmotive analysis to allow lawyers who have admitted to consideration of race or gender to
persuade a judge that they would have made the same decision without the forbidden reason.
See Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2002); Wallace v. Morrison, 87 F.3d 1271,
1274-75 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1531 (8th Cir. 1995); Jones
v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 1995); Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir.
1993). See generally Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives
and Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279, 279 (2007) (noting that the
Supreme Court has not yet ruled whether mixed-motive analysis, borrowed from Title VII
cases, should apply to the Batson rule, and arguing that it should not). If the Supreme Court
were to hold that mixed-motive analysis could apply to the Batson rule, that would render my
proposal less controversial, though still different from Batson because it would focus on
results rather than intent.
128. See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 (stating that lawyers need only tender a neutral reason,
not a “persuasive, or even plausible” reason).
129. The test requires the defendant to “make a liar out of the prosecutor.” Munson v.
State, 774 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); see José Felipé Anderson, Catch Me If You
Can! Resolving the Ethical Tragedies in the Brave New World of Jury Selection, 32 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 343, 374, 377 (1998) (recognizing that Batson “requires the judge to ask an officer of
the court whether he has violated his obligation to be candid with the court,” which is
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Batson requires trial judges to determine whether a lawyer acted
on a belief that race or gender can predict belief, something the
judge herself may believe given all of the empirical evidence to
support this reasoning.130 Judges tasked with enforcing the rule
often resist labeling lawyers as racist just because they have
engaged in race consciousness.131 They understand, for example,
that criminal defense lawyers representing minority clients violate
the rule almost as an ethical imperative.132 Some scholars have
“tantamount to an accusation of dishonesty,” and that trial courts “have little incentive to use
it against lawyers who regularly practice before them”); Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson
Doctrine: The Supreme Court’s Utter Failure to Meet the Challenge of Discrimination in Jury
Selection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 501, 531 (noting that it is “asking a lot” of the trial court to “doubt
the integrity of an attorney who has, in most cases, been in that trial courtroom before and
who is perhaps well-known to the trial judge”); Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception and
Discrimination After Batson, 50 STAN. L. REV. 9, 36 (1997); Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial
Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 787 (1999) (noting that a
finding that a prosecutor has intentionally violated a juror’s constitutional rights is “one that
no judge wants to reach lightly” and that “trial courts have a hard time finding the
prosecutor’s proffered explanation a subterfuge for purposeful discrimination”); William E.
Martin & Peter N. Thompson, Judicial Toleration of Racial Bias in the Minnesota Justice
System, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 235, 268 (2002) (“The trial judge’s task is complicated by the
reality that any finding of intentional discrimination may have serious ethical implications
for the prosecutor. It might be appropriate for judges to give prosecutors the benefit of the
doubt before making any finding that a prosecutor’s stated reason is a pretext and the
prosecutor has in fact engaged in impermissible racial discrimination.”); Page, supra note 115,
at 177-78 (recognizing that a finding of pretext is “likely to color the rest of the trial” as well
as “other trials in jurisdictions where lawyers appear frequently before the same judges”);
Roberts, supra note 92, at 1389.
130. See Tania Tetlow, How Batson Spawned Shaw—Requiring the Government to Treat
Citizens as Individuals When It Cannot, 49 LOY. L. REV. 133, 165 (2003); see also T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1066 (1991); Lucy Fowler,
Gender and Jury Deliberations: The Contributions of Social Science, 12 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 1, 26-30 (2005) (describing empirical research on the difference that gender
makes to jury deliberation); King, supra note 59, at 80-99 (discussing studies showing that
juror race affects verdicts, and also studies that show the opposite); Page, supra note 115, at
190-92.
131. See Robin Charlow, Batson “Blame” and Its Implications for Equal Protection Analysis,
97 IOWA L. REV. 1489, 1491-92 (2012); Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming
Attorneys to Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1087-88 (2009)
(noting that some judges may refuse to enforce Batson when peremptories are used against
blacks and whites equally); Page, supra note 115, at 177 (noting that granting a challenge is
akin to calling a lawyer a liar, and maybe racist and sexist as well).
132. See Tetlow, supra note 18, at 1727; see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S.
127, 148 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[By applying the Batson rule to gender, w]e also
increase the possibility that biased jurors will be allowed onto the jury, because sometimes
a lawyer will be unable to provide an acceptable gender-neutral explanation even though the
lawyer is in fact correct that the juror is unsympathetic. Similarly, in jurisdictions where law-
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urged courts to report lawyers to the bar after granting a Batson
challenge.133
We will consider the harms inherent in gender- or race-consciousness in Part III, but I argue that the more important flaw of peremptory challenges is the second harm: that lawyers have the
power to skew the diversity of a jury by eliminating minorities.
When groups are evenly matched in the pool, as is usually the case
with gender, dueling peremptories give each side equal access to
strike the gender they believe (possibly wrongly) will hurt them,
and the results might balance out.134 This also proves true with
racial diversity in a jurisdiction, often urban, in which racial groups
are evenly matched.135 But in much of the country, racial minorities
are few enough to be eliminated with peremptory challenges.136 Although we could attempt to adjust the number of peremptory
challenges granted to each side to correct this power, we cannot
effectively predict in advance the necessary numbers, or even which
side’s challenges should be reduced.137 In a hate crime trial, such as
Georgia v. McCollum, for example, the white defendants sought to
eliminate all of the black jurors.138
The eternal dilemma of jury selection revolves around whether
peremptory challenges can be salvaged and regulated or whether
they should be abandoned altogether. Although peremptories allow
us to root out bias that is subtle and unstated, they also tend to
yers exercise their strikes in open court, lawyers may be deterred from using their peremptories, out of the fear that if they are unable to justify the strike the court will seat a juror
who knows that the striking party thought him unfit. Because I believe the peremptory
remains an important litigator’s tool and a fundamental part of the process of selecting
impartial juries, our increasing limitation of it gives me pause.”).
133. See, e.g., Gershowitz, supra note 131, at 1065, 1084.
134. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 154-55 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the even
division of gender in society renders it undeserving of protection under Batson); cf. Ford,
supra note 87, at 413.
135. Cities of over 100,000 people with a slight majority African American population
include Washington, D.C., Detroit, Jackson, Miami Gardens, Birmingham, Baltimore, Memphis, New Orleans, Flint, St. Louis, Baton Rouge, Montgomery, Savannah, Wilmington,
Atlanta, Newark, and Cleveland. SONYA RASTOGI ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK
POPULATION: 2010, at 9, 15 (2011), available at http://perma.cc/VLG8-G83J.
136. See Cavise, supra note 129, at 527 (noting that minorities “usually appearing in much
smaller numbers, can be completely eliminated” with peremptory challenges).
137. It would depend on the racial makeup of a particular community. Further, sometimes
the prosecutor seeks to preserve minority representation in the jury. See infra Part III.A.
138. 505 U.S. 42, 44-45 (1992).
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skew the jury’s diversity and submit potential jurors to the rank
stereotyping complained of in Batson. That leaves us with four main
options: (1) retaining peremptories but regulating them for color
blindness (the current Batson approach); (2) retaining peremptories
but regulating them for diversity (the approach proposed by this
Article); (3) getting rid of peremptories altogether for both sides or
banning them for just the prosecutor but at a real cost to the quest
for impartiality; or (4) creating a color-conscious approach that
protects diversity more effectively than does random selection but
at an even greater cost to impartiality.
Ultimately, no perfect solution exists to the necessary trade-offs
between impartiality, diversity, and color-blind jury selection, but
we can better prioritize our goals. We can still regulate jury selection in a way that prioritizes impartiality and simultaneously
recognizes diversity as the most important tool in that regard. We
can avoid the cynicism of quotas without engaging in the distraction
of color blindness.
II. USING A SIXTH AMENDMENT TEST TO BALANCE IMPARTIALITY
AND DIVERSITY
Both peremptory challenges and jury diversity constitute
powerful tools in service of an impartial jury. I argue that we can
protect them both with a Sixth Amendment approach to regulate peremptory challenges, an approach that would negotiate between the
use of strikes to root out bias while protecting a diverse jury. This
would chart a course between the failed experiment of regulating
peremptories for color blindness and the extreme of ending peremptories altogether.
I join a few others who have proposed reliance on the Sixth
Amendment, but this Article is the first to describe how such a test
could function differently than the Batson test and to make clear
that the test should replace Batson, not just mirror it. Instead of
regulating peremptory challenges with color-blind equal protection
analysis, as Batson does, I would substitute a rationale that values
diversity.139 We would no longer pretend that race does not matter:
139. As I describe in more detail below, this would require replacing the reasoning of Batson with the road not taken in Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990). See infra Part II.C.1.
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we would regulate the diversity of the jury because race does matter.
A. The Specifics of a Sixth Amendment Test: Three Very Different
Steps
My proposal would resemble the Batson three-step rule but would
function very differently. In step one, at the end of jury selection, a
lawyer could challenge the use of peremptory challenges that alter
the diversity of the jury.140 In step two, the challenged lawyer would
need to justify those strikes that skewed diversity with specific concerns about a juror’s potential bias without relying merely on the
juror’s race or gender. In step three, however, the judge then would
weigh the importance of those stated reasons about a juror’s impartiality against the importance of the diversity sacrificed without
that juror. Unlike the Batson rule, the judge would no longer
measure the veracity of the reason but its merit. And although we
would not allow lawyers to specifically rely on race as the basis for
their strike, we would no longer ask them to deny that they thought
about race.141 This would constitute a far more objective and reviewable test than asking judges to look a lawyer in the eye to measure
whether he is telling the truth when claiming to be properly color
blind.
Before we begin to regulate jury selection, however, we first need
an expanded right to lawyer-directed voir dire for the information
necessary to seek an impartial jury.142 Without that, lawyers and
judges fly blind in identifying those jurors who may have prejudged
the case, those jurors who have a strong sympathy towards the
victim and antipathy towards the defendant (or the other way
around), and those jurors who have personal experience or strong

140. As described below, this process would need to occur at the end of jury selection in
order to determine the final impact of all peremptories on diversity. See infra Part II.A.1.
141. This would also apply to the other suspect categories under equal protection law. See
supra note 32. I focus more on race in this Article, but as I have argued elsewhere, gender
discrimination functions similarly to racial discrimination, particularly in trials of genderbased violence. See Tetlow, supra note 2, at 81-82.
142. See Tetlow, supra note 86, at 1140-58 (arguing for a broader voir dire right and for its
application to prosecutors).
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opinions about the crime charged.143 Jurors can be surprisingly honest about admitting those prejudices when asked the right question,
but more often, they reveal prejudices only subtly and unwittingly.144 Although scholars often remain cynical about the possibility of
rooting out bias such as racism, indirect questions, such as asking
how the juror feels about affirmative action or the Trayvon Martin
trial, can demonstrate much about someone’s attitudes towards race
in all of their complexity.
This is also an area in which the goals of impartiality and color
blindness converge. Ironically, the broader voir dire rights that the
Supreme Court has rejected would constitute the easiest solution to
the kind of stereotyping the Court banned in Batson.145 When lawyers have no other information, race and gender constitute the most

143. See id. at 1147 & n.178 (“[W]e do not allow the possibility of a false answer to serve
as an excuse for not asking these questions.”); see also Ford, supra note 87, at 390; Spears,
supra note 85, at 1504, 1507, 1523.
144. Spears, supra note 85, at 1506, 1523-24 n.122; see People v. Williams, 628 P.2d 869,
877 (Cal. 1981) (holding that counsel should be allowed to ask questions to elicit bias on voir
dire), superseded by statute, Proposition 115 (June 5, 1990) (codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. § 223
(West 2014)), as recognized in People v. Noguera, 842 P.2d 1160 (Cal. 1992). The Williams
court recognized that
although we must presume that a potential juror is responding in good faith
when he asserts broadly that he can judge the case impartially, further interrogation may reveal bias of which he is unaware or which, because of his impaired
objectivity, he reasonably believes he can overcome. And although his protestations of impartiality may immunize him from a challenge for cause, they should
not foreclose further reasonable questioning that might expose bias on which
prudent counsel would base a peremptory challenge.
Williams, 628 P.2d at 873 (internal citations omitted); see also Fowler, supra note 130, at 45
(discussing the use of voir dire to eliminate jurors with gender prejudices); Wendy Parker,
Juries, Race, and Gender: A Story of Today’s Inequality, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 209, 212
(2011) (stating that “many studies demonstrate a bias of white jurors against black
defendants”); Barat S. McClain, Note, Turner’s Acceptance of Limited Voir Dire Renders
Batson’s Equal Protection a Hollow Promise, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 273, 306 (1989) (discussing
the importance of voir dire to eliminating jury discrimination without violating Batson’s
prohibition on presuming such prejudice according to race); cf. Alschuler, supra note 83, at
203 (finding that, for all their mythologies and traditions, lawyers usually fail at voir dire);
Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who Is an Impartial Juror in an Age of Mass Media?, 40
AM. U. L. REV. 631, 650-51 (1991) (arguing that voir dire “fails to elicit accurate or honest
responses from potential jurors” and is therefore ineffective to root out prejudice).
145. See United States v. Greer, 968 F.2d 433, 445 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Higginbotham,
J., writing for the half of the court that would reverse) (describing the importance of allowing
broad voir dire on issues of potential prejudice in order to avoid Batson error), aff’g 939 F.3d
1076 (5th Cir. 1991).

1892

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1859

relevant facts available to lawyers during jury selection.146 Broad
voir dire can correct demographic stereotypes in an immediate way
that teaches lawyers to be careful in their reliance on them.147 At
the same time, broad voir dire allows us to seek out the prejudice
that pollutes jury deliberations or the bias that clouds judgment.148
1. Step One: Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Skewed
Diversity
After voir dire and the exercise of challenges, the proposed Sixth
Amendment test would then regulate the results of jury selection.
In step one of the test, either side could challenge the use of
peremptory challenges to skew the diversity of the jury. This would
be a far more results-oriented test than step one of the Batson test,
which focuses on patterns of strikes as evidence of a lawyer’s
motives.149 Instead, this test would measure the extent to which
146. See id.; see also Brian J. Serr & Mark Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the
Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1,
55 n.301 (1988) (“Prosecutorial inquiry into the existence of specific bias, rather than merely
striking because of broad assumptions based on race, age, or status, actually promotes the
accuracy of peremptory challenges.”).
147. The information gathered from individuals will sometimes confirm stereotypes as well,
but will certainly remind lawyers that such stereotypes are overbroad guesses. Lawyers
allowed to ask questions will often find that appearances are deceiving and that they have
entirely misread a particular juror. Lawyers will also be reminded to broaden their
understanding of racial experience, and remember, for example, that members of the black
community who suffer the most from police misconduct often also suffer the most from violent
crime.
148. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1994) (“If conducted properly, voir
dire can inform litigants about potential jurors, making reliance upon stereotypical and
pejorative notions about a particular gender or race both unnecessary and unwise. Voir dire
provides a means of discovering actual or implied bias and a firmer basis upon which the
parties may exercise their peremptory challenges intelligently.”).
149. See Batson v. Kentucky, 427 U.S. 79, 95, 97 (1986) (finding that a defendant makes
a prima facie case by showing purposeful discrimination in the selection of his venire in his
specific case); Tracy M.Y. Choy, Note, Branding Neutral Explanations Pretextual Under
Batson v. Kentucky: An Examination of the Role of the Trial Judge in Jury Selection, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 577, 584 (1997). Batson does not purport to care about the impact of strikes on
the jury’s ultimate diversity; rather, it concerns itself with the far murkier question of
whether a pattern of strikes proves racial motive. James R. Gadwood, Note, The Framework
Comes Crumbling Down: Juryquest in a Batson World, 88 B.U. L. REV. 291, 297-99 (2008); see
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170 (2005) (modifying the threshold of Batson’s first step
by allowing defendants to make a prima facie case by showing evidence sufficient to establish
an “inference that discrimination has occurred,” without elaborating on what sufficiently
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diversity has in fact been skewed after jury selection is finished.150
If dueling strikes have no ultimate impact on the diversity of the
resulting jury because they cancel each other out, there would be no
need to entertain a challenge.151 Because a jury constitutes such a
small sample, any divergence in diversity would suffice to raise a
challenge.152
I would measure diversity with regard to the categories the
Supreme Court has already deemed suspect classes under equal
protection analysis. Race and gender, among others, are suspect
classes and always worthy of the highest scrutiny; eye color and
profession are not.153 Although I believe in the impact of a much
broader diversity than these categories, we need a limiting principle. It makes sense to focus on the factors most associated with a
specific divergence in experience.154 Further, the Court could
consider a challenge to the striking of whites, though the Court
establishes the inference); Francis, supra note 16, at 360-61 & n.408 (arguing that Batson
should apply with reference to the impact of strikes, not just the percentage of strikes used
on minorities, and citing cases that hold the opposite).
150. This would require challenges to come at the end of jury selection rather than after
individual strikes, and would require jurors to remain available in case they were reseated.
151. Accordingly, there would be no dueling challenges on the subject of race, for example,
because there could only be a challenge to the side that ended up underrepresented. In other
words, if the defense lawyer struck white jurors and the prosecutor struck black jurors, and
the jury ended up disproportionately white, then the defense lawyer would have a right to
challenge the prosecutor without having to explain her own strikes. The test is about impact
on diversity, not motive. The only dueling challenges would involve different categories of
diversity; for example, one side might complain about too few black jurors and the other side
might complain about too few women.
152. This would be true even if the difference in percentage were slight because sometimes
that means the difference between a little racial diversity or none.
153. This would expand further than Batson to other suspect categories like national origin
and religion not yet adopted by the Supreme Court for application of the Batson rule. See A.C.
Johnstone, Comment, Peremptory Pragmatism: Religion and the Administration of the Batson
Rule, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 441, 441 (describing the Supreme Court’s refusal to address the
application of the rule to religion).
154. See Muller, supra note 33, at 146 (rebutting the argument that a Sixth Amendment
test need apply to all and stating that the Court “has had little trouble limiting community
representation to groups it deems ‘distinctive’ within the community”). Jeffrey Abramson
argues that the move towards more interest group politics has diminished our conception of
a broader diversity and sends the wrong signal to jurors about the nature of jury
deliberations. ABRAMSON, supra note 35, at 124-25. I agree, but there is no viable way to
enforce diversity in its broadest sense, and the experiences of gender and racial oppression
remain among the most relevant to rooting out the problem of race and gender discrimination
on juries.
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might worry less about protecting the participation of the majority
in order to protect diversity.155
The test would compare the diversity of suspect categories
resulting after jury selection is complete to the diversity available
in the venire.156 Yet I leave the decision of whether to make a
challenge to the lawyers rather than the judge because many
categories of lost diversity will not seem relevant to the parties.157
I would also make the challenge available to both sides, despite
the fact that the Sixth Amendment applies by its terms only to the
defendant.158 The guarantee of an impartial jury by definition
requires balanced scales, and thus cannot practically operate as a
one-sided rule. “Although the constitutional guarantee runs only to
the individual and not to the State, the goal it expresses is jury
impartiality with respect to both contestants: neither the defendant
nor the State should be favored.”159 As an instrumental measure,
therefore, we must harness the adversarial process to achieve that
balance.160 And although the Sixth Amendment applies only to
155. To exclude whites from the analysis would (a) make this an even more uphill battle
against current equal protection jurisprudence; (b) create a lopsided rule that allowed only
whites to be struck as such, thus unbalancing the diversity of the jury; and (c) have odd applications in jurisdictions, including many cities, where whites are in the numerical minority.
156. To compare jury diversity to the diversity of the community would function too much
like racial quotas, in ways that raise equal protection issues discussed below. See infra Part
II.C.1.
157. I imagine that gender and national origin would seem relevant less frequently than
might race, and in some cases, none of these categories may seem relevant to the parties. It
is also entirely possible that a party might make a challenge to a category for the purpose of
gamesmanship even if they do not care about the actual category of diversity, just in the hope
of costing the other side a strike that they might deem important without the ability to
explain why. I do not see a way around this risk, but I tend to think it would not prove terribly
effective. The judge is unlikely to worry as much about protecting diversity of a category that
seems irrelevant to the case at hand, nor would a strike that truly cannot be articulated be
worthy of as much concern.
158. See Francis, supra note 16, at 305 (stating that the Sixth Amendment is limited to the
defendant, and thus would preclude application of a Batson-type rule to the defendant’s use
of peremptory challenges); Massaro, supra note 33, at 560.
159. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 483 (1990).
160. See, e.g., Howeth, supra note 33, at 615. To explain the limits of this principle, the
argument would not apply to the defendant’s other rights under the Sixth Amendment, for
example, the right to a jury trial or the Confrontation Clause guarantee. Kirk, supra note 33,
at 841-42 (noting that a fair cross-section requirement would prohibit either side from racially
skewing the jury). These rights do not require an adversarial balancing to make them
operative in the way that an impartial jury does.
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criminal trials, Congress and state legislatures could, and should,
choose to extend it statutorily to civil cases.161
2. Steps Two and Three: Balancing Specific Concerns About
Impartiality Against the Importance of Diversity to an
Impartial Jury
In step two of the test, a lawyer whose strikes resulted in a
reduction of diversity would need to articulate a specific and relevant concern about the juror’s bias. Merely making an argument
that race or gender correlates to a particular belief would not
suffice, but unlike in Batson, we would no longer ask if the lawyer
considered race or gender. For example, if a defense lawyer worries
that white jurors are more likely to be racist against a black client,
the lawyer must articulate more specific reasons for concern about
individual jurors. During an expanded right of voir dire, the lawyer
would need to ask questions designed to reveal racial attitudes and
distinguish among those white jurors. We would no longer ask the
lawyer to solemnly deny on his honor that he considered race, nor
would it be a problem if the lawyer admitted that fact. But the
lawyer would need to articulate specific evidence of his concern
about actual bias.
Unlike Batson, however, we would measure the quality of that
reason, not just its sincerity. In step three of the test, the judge
would decide whether the concerns about the juror’s impartiality
should trump the resulting impact on the jury’s diversity.162 This is
a necessarily subjective balancing test, but one focused on the right
priorities measuring the strength of the reason, rather than its sincerity. This test would allow trial judges to overturn strikes based
on some of the sillier reasons upheld under Batson (from a man
wearing a beard to a woman wearing earrings).163
161. See 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (2012); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 795 (2008); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 26.02 (West 2014); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.261 (West 2013).
162. Jeffrey Abramson proposed a similar test, but labels it as mere enforcement of the
Batson rule. See Abramson, supra note 56. He fails to acknowledge that the Batson rule itself
forbids regulating peremptories in order to protect diversity, because that violates the colorblind ideal that race does not matter to jury deliberation.
163. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68 (1995) (per curiam) (upholding a strike
based on beards and noting that “the second step of this process does not demand an
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Lawyers could defend their strikes by articulating specific reasons
sufficient to call the juror’s impartiality into question.164 This would
result in a standard higher than the often arbitrary guesswork of
unregulated peremptories, but it would protect peremptories from
the near certainty now required of for-cause challenges. The entire
point of attempting to regulate peremptory challenges is to retain
some of the benefit of their overinclusiveness in the battle against
strong bias. Let me give examples. Meaningful concerns about
impartiality would include a prejudice against or bias towards the
defendant, the government, or a key witness. They would include a
juror’s personal experience with crime, as the victim or the accused.
And they would definitely include those jurors who openly confess
to concerns about their own impartiality during voir dire, but avoid
a for-cause challenge because they then promise to be fair.
The realm of acceptable answers to a Sixth Amendment challenge
would not include the preservation of diversity. I propose this
restriction for pragmatic rather than ideological reasons. Allowing
each litigant to police diversity by countering the other side’s strikes
would devolve into an endless circle. Instead we would vest that
responsibility with the judge, who would marshal the results on
diversity of dueling strikes while the lawyers focus on using
peremptories for more individualized concerns over bias.
That begs another, more difficult question. I have previously
argued that race might be relevant to predicting bias,165 so how can
I prohibit a party from using race alone to explain their concern over
a particular juror? This essentially represents a compromise. No
longer would we pretend, despite all empirical evidence, that race
and gender do not frequently predict belief. But if we allowed strikes
explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible”); United States v. Claytor, No. 7:05 CR
0007, 2005 WL 1745642, at *3 (W.D. Va. July 26, 2005) (upholding a strike based on reason
that juror wore earrings in each ear); see also Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening
Batson’s Net to Ensnare More than the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative
Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1090-98 (2011) (providing other examples of upholding
strikes based on frivolous reasons).
164. See Alschuler, supra note 83, at 207 (proposing such a test for for-cause challenges);
Underwood, supra note 104, at 762-64 (describing some reasons for challenges such as
prospective jurors who give, but then retract, grounds for removal for cause, and jurors who
are part of a category, like an occupation, that might oppose the litigant).
165. See Tetlow, supra note 130, at 142-43; Tetlow, supra note 18, at 1720-21; supra Part
I.A.

2015]

SOLVING BATSON

1897

based on nothing more than race and gender, we would necessarily
frustrate the quest for diversity.166 It would remove any opportunity
for the judge to act as the protector of diversity.
Requiring lawyers to articulate other reasons for their strikes
after broad voir dire also has the advantage of testing their assumptions without denying that those assumptions are never true. As I
discuss below in this Part, I do not believe that the alleged injury to
potential jurors from silent stereotyping creates an equal protection
violation worthy of restricting the quest for an impartial jury.167 Yet
such stereotyping is worth avoiding when possible.168 Given the
opportunity in voir dire to be more precise and individualized in our
predictions, it is not necessary to rely solely on stereotypes that
make us deeply uncomfortable.169
Remember that at the moment, we do not allow judges to
measure the quality of the reason for a strike, but only its sincerity.
This requires judges to gauge the honesty of the men and women
who practice before them, a difficult task at best and one almost
impossible to measure on appeal.170 The Batson rule also requires
personally insulting prosecutors and defense lawyers in a way that
judges do not take lightly, calling them liars and implying that they
are racist.171 Technically, as some have argued, lying to the court
constitutes an ethics violation that the judge should then report to

166. See Abramson, supra note 56, at 132-33 (describing how allowing strikes based on
group stereotypes would necessarily frustrate diversity as a practical matter).
167. See infra Part II.C.
168. This would also bring jury selection law in line with the more cautious use of color
blindness in the legislative redistricting cases, in which we do not demand that legislators
swear that they never considered race as they draw district lines, or in affirmative action in
admission cases, in which race can be a plus factor to promote diversity. See infra Part II.C.
169. See Colbert, supra note 3, at 121 n.584 (“For jury selection to be meaningful, the
defense attorney must conduct the voir dire.”); Andrew G. Gordon, Beyond Batson v.
Kentucky: A Proposed Ethical Rule Prohibiting Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 685, 705 (1993); Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not To
Say Race) of Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21, 45-46 (1993); Ogletree, supra
note 109, at 1127-28; McClain, supra note 144, at 300; Spears, supra note 85, at 1504.
170. See Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 163, at 1099-102 (finding that the Batson challenges
actually granted or reversed on appeal tend to involve attorneys who have in fact admitted
to thinking about a forbidden category, who have given a reason that would have applied to
a retained juror of a different demographic category, or who have given a patently false reason
not supported by the record).
171. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
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the bar for disciplinary proceedings.172 Disconnecting the regulation
of jury selection from the motives of lawyers will make judges far
more likely to enforce the rule.173
Let me illustrate the difference between the two tests. In a hate
crime trial of a white defendant, the defense lawyer might attempt
to strike black jurors because of concerns that they would favor
conviction. The prosecutor in turn might attempt to use all his
strikes on white jurors because of concerns about racism against the
victim. Everyone in the courtroom, including the judge, would
understand that both sides would find it almost impossible not to
think about race, particularly while they were being reminded not
to think about race.174
Under a Batson test, both lawyers would need to give neutral
reasons for their strikes and swear that they did not consider
race.175 Theoretically, a judge who finds it incredible to believe that
neither side considered race should grant all the Batson challenges,
and report those lawyers to the bar association for discipline.176 As
172. See Gordon, supra note 169, at 712-17. Charles Ogletree has suggested beefing up
Batson sanctions to include contempt and suspension. Ogletree, supra note 109, at 1122.
173. Many scholars have attempted to work within the Batson rule to require that the
proffered explanation be more objectively reasonable. See, e.g., Bellin & Semitsu, supra note
163, at 1121-25 (arguing for a higher standard of proof to rebut the appearance of discriminatory motive without requiring a finding of pretext); Cavise, supra note 129, at 549-50
(suggesting that judges require that a proffered justification “makes sense”); Henning, supra
note 129, at 794-95 (suggesting that one method of improving Batson would be “to lower the
standard by which the trial court can remove a juror for cause” by allowing the courts to
“combine the prima facie requirement of Batson with the challenge for cause, requiring the
attorney who appears to be striking jurors in a discriminatory manner to justify the peremptory challenges by something more than just a neutral explanation”); Camille A. Nelson,
Batson, O.J., and Snyder: Lessons from an Intersecting Trilogy, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1687, 1703
(2008) (arguing that a Batson challenge should be upheld “when the evidence fits a hypothesis
of racial discrimination ... better than the race neutral reason offered”); Page, supra note 115,
at 260-61 (recognizing the benefits of an “objective” standard for Batson violations and
suggesting that trial courts could find that although an attorney believed she “acted in good
faith,” she would not have exercised the peremptory challenge “but for the potential juror’s
race or gender” and thus acted unconstitutionally). Each of these proposals struggles to create
an end-run to the Batson rule, which clearly rests on discriminatory motive, not effect.
174. See Brand, supra note 14, at 616-17; Abbe Smith, “Nice Work If You Can Get It”:
“Ethical” Jury Selection in Criminal Defense, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 565-66 (1998) (arguing
that it is unethical for a criminal defense lawyer to ignore insights into the impact of juror
race and gender in order to comply with McCollum).
175. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986).
176. See Gordon, supra note 169, at 712-17. But see MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 8.4 cmt. 4 (2003) (suggesting that a “trial judge’s finding that peremptory challenges
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a practical matter, the judge would probably grant none of the challenges. Even if the lawyers gave quite frivolous sounding reasons for
their strikes, the judge could measure only the sincerity of those
reasons, not their merit.177 It is a test weakened by the legal fiction
upon which it is based—that race does not matter—which calls into
question the whole enterprise. The judge could not, moreover,
consider the resulting diversity of the jury because Batson makes
that unconstitutional.178
Under a Sixth Amendment test, in contrast, the judge could wait
to see whether dueling strikes actually affected diversity, which
would depend on the breakdown of the venire. The judge could
acknowledge, without finding a constitutional violation, that the
defense lawyer worried about black jurors prejudging his client and
that the prosecutor worried that white jurors might discriminate
against the black victims of a hate crime. But the judge could
require that these lawyers actually show some evidence of bias
beyond mere race. If, despite expanded voir dire by the attorneys, a
struck juror did not reveal any signals that he would be unable to
listen to the evidence and to fairly deliberate the case, the judge
should then overrule the strike to protect the diversity of the jury.
Conversely, the judge should allow the strike if there was specific
evidence of potential bias, perhaps if a juror had himself been the
victim of a hate crime or had avidly followed news coverage of the
case, yet promised to be fair. And unlike the entirely discretionary
lie detector test of the Batson rule, this new balancing test could be
evaluated on appeal as a question of law.179
The test represents a compromise between values, an attempt to
prioritize them properly and to balance them. I acknowledge fully
that it will prove heavily subjective and will vary by the judge.180
were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish” conduct in violation of the
Model Rules); John William Clark IV, Comment, Batson v. Kentucky and the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct: Is a Violation of Batson also an Ethical Violation?, 29 J. LEGAL
PROF. 205, 211 (2005).
177. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 766-68 (1995) (per curiam).
178. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-87 & n.6.
179. See Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 163, at 1098; Cavise, supra note 129, at 529-31.
180. I can make a few predictions about how it would function. Although the test is not race
specific, I imagine most judges would work harder to reverse a dilution of minority
representation rather than a dilution of majority representation. I imagine judges might
worry less about gender than about race because gender is usually evenly divided in the
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Yet this test should prove stronger than Batson for reasons both
pragmatic and ideological. It avoids looking into the character of
prosecutors and defense lawyers and provides a far more practical
method of enforcement. More to the point, a Sixth Amendment test
necessarily would be better for jury diversity than Batson because
it does not deny the value of diversity. For the first time, we would
grant judges the permission and responsibility to actively defend the
diversity of the jury. Although judges would vary in how zealously
they carried out this task, anything they accomplish would be better
than what we have now.
B. Why Holland v. Illinois Was Wrong: The Sixth Amendment
Should Regulate Jury Selection
The test I propose would require revisiting the fork in the road
the Supreme Court faced in regulating peremptory challenges. It
would require reversal of the color-blind logic of Batson. And it
would require reversal of the Court’s decision in Holland v. Illinois
to reject the application of the Sixth Amendment to trial juries. In
Holland, a narrow majority engaged in exaggerated slippery slope
arguments, contending that application of the Sixth Amendment to
trial juries would require quotas for every imaginable group and
thus gut the Amendment’s primary purpose of impartiality.181 The
Court could not imagine how to thread the needle between applying
fair cross-section doctrine to jury selection without requiring de
facto quotas. I have tried to answer that question here.
In 1986, the defendant in Batson relied heavily on both Sixth
Amendment fair cross-section doctrine and the Equal Protection
Clause in his arguments to the Supreme Court.182 Indeed, years
before, the California Supreme Court had crafted a test banning the
racial use of peremptory challenges, relying on the Sixth Amendment to create a rule that functioned very similarly to the one I now
propose.183 Yet the Batson Court rejected the Sixth Amendment path
venire and both sides have equal opportunities to favor one or the other.
181. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480-84 (1990).
182. The petitioner relied more heavily on Sixth Amendment fair cross-section claims than
on equal protection. Brief for Petitioner at 8-18, Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (No. 84-6263), 1985 WL
669926, at *8-18.
183. See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 762 (Cal. 1978) (using Sixth Amendment analysis
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without comment and relied on the Equal Protection Clause reasoning I contest below.
Four years later in Holland, however, the Sixth Amendment
question was put squarely before the Court. Daniel Holland, convicted before the ruling in Batson, failed to preserve an Equal
Protection challenge to his jury’s selection and therefore asked the
Supreme Court to acknowledge the Sixth Amendment as another
constitutional basis for the Batson rule.184 Justice Scalia, writing for
a 5-4 majority, claimed that the Court had never before applied the
fair cross-section requirement to govern petit juries and rejected the
invitation to do so.185 He argued that, although the Sixth Amendment forbids the government from “stack[ing] the deck” by eliminating certain groups from the venire, once both sides operate on a
fair playing field, they can exercise peremptory challenges with
impunity.186
Of course, the argument that the Sixth Amendment had never
applied to petit juries was “rank revisionism.”187 In a heated dissent,
Justice Marshall pointed out that the Court had applied the Sixth
Amendment repeatedly to define the very nature of the trial jury in
order to preserve the possibility of achieving a fair cross section on
the jury.188 The Court held unconstitutional a jury with five members because it left too little opportunity for diversity.189 The Court
to ban race-conscious peremptory challenges). Wheeler established the rebuttable presumption
for the constitutional exercise of peremptory challenges, overcome by showing a “strong likelihood” that challenges are based on group association rather than specific bias. Id. at 764.
After the court determined a prima facie case had been made, the burden shifted to the opposing party to establish that the challenges were not based on group bias alone, but rather that
they were exercised either on specific bias or grounds reasonably relevant to the instant case.
Id.
184. The defendant in Holland failed to anticipate the equal protection basis of the Court’s
ruling in Batson, and preserved only Sixth Amendment objections to the prosecutor’s use of
peremptory challenges in his trial. Holland, 493 U.S. at 476, 487. As a white defendant
complaining about the striking of black jurors, Holland apparently worried he would lack
standing to make an equal protection argument. See Arguments Before the Court: Criminal
Law and Procedure, 58 U.S.L.W. 3279, 3280 (1989).
185. Holland, 493 U.S. at 482-83.
186. Id. at 481. Justice Scalia, who dissented in Batson, did acknowledge that prosecutors
still operated under its restrictions. Id. at 486-87.
187. Muller, supra note 33, at 139 (“The Court’s decision in Holland is hard to fathom.”).
188. Holland, 493 U.S. at 494-95 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
189. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
requires a jury of at least six in order to offer a proper opportunity to obtain a fair cross
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required that juries issue verdicts by at least a three-fourths
majority to protect the intended benefit of a fair cross section of
jurors.190 Further, as described above, the Supreme Court in the
Sixth Amendment cases recognized diversity as the most important
tool in the quest for impartiality, one that should not lightly be cast
aside at the moment of jury selection.191
The majority in Holland recognized the fair cross-section requirement as a tool of impartiality, but then claimed that applying that
tool to the trial jury would do too much damage to the role of
peremptory challenges in protecting impartiality, creating a
nightmarish system of quotas for every imaginable demographic
group.192 Ultimately, as Justice Scalia argued, the “Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross section on the venire is a means of
assuring, not a representative jury (which the Constitution does not
demand), but an impartial one (which it does).”193
I defend the role of peremptory challenges in Part III because I
agree that the instrumental tool of diversity should not swallow the
ultimate goal of impartiality. Yet Justice Scalia failed to recognize
how much diversity and impartiality overlap before they diverge.194
He failed to recognize that an even playing field of peremptory challenges still allows for the elimination of minority voices, a practice
that has taken a terrible toll on our justice system.195
section of the community).
190. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362-63 (1972) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
requires at least a 9-3 vote for conviction). For a fuller description of the constitutional basis
for a Sixth Amendment rule, see Muller, supra note 33, at 137-48.
191. See Holland, 493 U.S. at 503-04 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The elimination of racial
discrimination in our system of criminal justice is not a constitutional goal that should lightly
be set aside.”).
192. Id. at 486 (majority opinion) (“His Sixth Amendment claim would be just as strong if
the object of the exclusion had been, not blacks, but postmen, or lawyers, or clergymen, or any
number of other identifiable groups.”).
193. Id. at 480.
194. Id. at 493 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing Justice Scalia’s “false dichotomy”
between a fair cross section and impartiality). Justice Scalia, moreover, failed to acknowledge
that the damage he warned of had already been done. In the world of Batson regulation, it is
hard to imagine how the Sixth Amendment could do anything more to restrict peremptory
challenges. Holland clearly asked for a test that would function exactly as Batson did, and ban
the purposeful use of peremptory challenges by race. Id. at 478 (majority opinion). Because
I propose ending the Batson test, however, I have more work to do to address Scalia’s
criticism.
195. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1656
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Perhaps we can have our cake and eat it too. We should apply the
Sixth Amendment to regulate peremptories so as to preserve the
opportunity to achieve a fair cross section on the petit jury. We can
accomplish this without protecting postal workers and people with
blue eyes. We can, as we already do, focus on suspect classifications.196 Nor do we need to slide into quotas in order to allow the
judge to protect both important tools of impartiality by negotiating
between them. We should vest the trial judge with responsibility to
balance the use of peremptory challenges to seek the impartial jury
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment without unnecessarily sacrificing the instrumental tool of diversity. Peremptory challenges
serve as our primary procedural protection of impartiality, but a
jury resembling a fair cross section of the community also serves a
crucial role worthy of protection.
C. Why Batson Was Wrong: Equal Protection Does Not Ban
Recognition that Racial Diversity on Juries Matters
Faced with the fork in the road between regulating jury selection
for diversity or color blindness, the Supreme Court chose color
blindness.197 This did not represent a mere divergence between the
two paths, but rather a conflict so great that my proposed Sixth
Amendment rule would also require reversal of Batson. Currently,
the Batson rule does not allow trial judges to consider and to regulate the diversity of the jury, as I propose, because Batson denies the

(1985). See generally KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 3-135 (describing the history of racial overenforcement and underenforcement of the law, including the misconduct of all-white juries).
196. See Holland, 493 U.S. at 502 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s exaggerated
claim that ‘postmen, or lawyers, or clergymen’ are distinctive groups within the meaning of
our fair-cross-section cases will no doubt be quickly inferred if ever a litigant reaches the
Supreme Court claiming that such groups are ‘distinctive.’ To date, at least, this Court has
found only women and certain racial minorities to have the sorts of characteristics that would
make a group ‘distinctive’ for fair-cross-section purposes.” (citations omitted)); Muller, supra
note 33, at 142-48 (explaining why a Sixth Amendment rationale would not need to create
quotas for race or any other category). There exists much jurisprudence already distinguishing
between categories worthy of special scrutiny (e.g., race and gender) versus those that are not
(e.g., occupation and eye color).
197. This choice was presented in Batson itself. The defendant relied more heavily on Sixth
Amendment fair cross-section claims than on equal protection. See Brief for Petitioner at 5,
8-10, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (No. 84-6263), 1985 WL 669926, at *4, *12-17.
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very relevance of race.198 The Supreme Court requires color
blindness by everyone in the courtroom, going so far as to forbid
trial judges from presuming that racism might impact a verdict
because such a presumption would prove “too divisive” as a constitutional matter.199 Instead judges must model an aspirational color
blindness.200
The restriction on judges does not represent the only conflict
between the two paths. The Batson rule also forbids the lawyers
exercising peremptory challenges from considering race as they
guess about partiality.201 The Court does so not to protect the defendant’s rights to an impartial jury nor the public’s right to a fair
criminal justice system.202 Instead, the Batson rule seeks to protect
potential jurors from the then newly created harm of racial stereotyping standing alone.203 As such, the test does not purport to protect
198. United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 207-08 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that Batson
forbids district courts from adding and subtracting jurors in order to achieve a racially and
religiously diverse jury); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 157 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s reasoning denying the relevance of gender
to jury selection contradicted Sixth Amendment jurisprudence); Forman, supra note 68, at 54
(noting the conflict between Sixth Amendment and equal protection jurisprudence on whether
gender matters); Gerken, supra note 22, at 1113-15 (describing the “doctrinal puzzle”); Muller,
supra note 33, at 97, 101-02 (noting the striking contrast between the Court’s Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence, which suggests that difference matters, and Batson’s pretending
that it does not).
199. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 n.8 (1976) (limiting defendant’s right to voir dire
about racial prejudice to cases in which racism will clearly be an issue in the trial, and
forbidding judges from assuming that risk).
200. Tetlow, supra note 18, at 1737.
201. Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical
Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 946, 965 (1998) (noting that a defendant is “entitled to a jury drawn
from a fair cross section,” but “when actually seating a jury ... he may not take those same
characteristics into account”); Case Comment, supra note 68, at 173 (“[A]fter Holland the
sixth amendment permits and encourages what the fourteenth amendment prohibits. The
inevitable friction between Holland and Batson will affect the practical articulation of the
Batson rule. This friction is the result of Holland’s misconception of the appropriate content
of the impartiality guarantee. Properly understood, the sixth and fourteenth amendments
respond in harmony to condemn discriminatory selection procedures.” (footnotes omitted)).
202. The Court in Batson listed the defendant’s rights as one of its three concerns, along
with the rights of potential jurors and the right of the public to the perception of a fair criminal justice system. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86-88. In Batson’s progeny, the Court increasingly made
clear that the rights of defendants did not factor into the Batson rule. See Muller, supra note
33, at 122.
203. Francis, supra note 16, at 310 (stating that Batson subordinates the defendant’s more
important rights of liberty and due process to the equal protection rights of jurors); Tetlow,
supra note 18, at 1718, 1731, 1735; see Herman, supra note 11, at 1818-19.
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the goal of an impartial jury, and proves willing to impose on impartiality if need be.204
Let me explain why this proves such a distraction from the
primary goal. The reason, in fact, that most judges and scholars care
about regulating peremptory challenges is because they correctly
believe that diversity does matter, that race frequently does predict
belief, and that we want those beliefs to be represented on the jury
to increase the chances of a correct verdict.205 The reason that
Batson has so utterly failed to protect diversity and impartiality is
because Batson has changed the subject entirely. As Eric Muller has
pointed out, if Batson’s logic that race does not matter were true,
then the Batson error by definition could have no impact on the
verdict.206 We would have no reason to worry about all-white juries
committing injustice because the Supreme Court has told us that
the race of jurors is irrelevant.207 To believe otherwise while choosing a jury, the Court held, violates the Constitution.208
My proposed test would focus on the rights of defendants and the
actual fairness of the criminal justice system. It would grapple with
the endemic racial discrimination that mars our system, not
through the mandated use of denial, but by protecting the jury
diversity necessary to combat that discrimination. Without throwing
open the doors to overt use of racial stereotypes, it would carve out
a middle ground that more closely resembles the rest of equal
protection doctrine. Lawyers could not affirmatively rely on the
correlation between race and belief when justifying a strike that
skewed diversity, nor would we require lawyers to deny that they
204. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992) (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991)).
205. Hubert S. Feild, Juror Background Characteristics and Attitudes Toward Rape:
Correlates of Jurors’ Decisions in Rape Trials, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 73, 82-91 (1978)
(discussing the predictability of jurors’ votes in rape cases); Ford, supra note 87, at 390;
Fowler, supra note 130, at 26-30 (describing empirical research on the difference that gender
makes to jury deliberation); Solomon M. Fulero & Steven D. Penrod, The Myths and Realities
of Attorney Jury Selection Folklore and Scientific Jury Selection: What Works?, 17 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 229, 244-51 (1990); Johnson, supra note 195, at 1636-43; King, supra note 59, at 80-99
(discussing studies showing that juror race affects verdicts, and also studies that show the
opposite); Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should)
Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 9-14 (1997).
206. Muller, supra note 33, at 122.
207. Id. at 122-23.
208. Id. at 122.
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considered that correlation during jury selection. We would no
longer equate race consciousness with racism, but we would require
lawyers, using expanded rights to voir dire, to come up with more
specific concerns about impartiality. Most importantly, we would
allow judges to regulate jury selection to protect jury diversity.
1. Valuing Diversity in Equal Protection Analysis
The application of equal protection analysis to jury selection tends
to get lost in the scholarly divisions between constitutional law and
criminal procedure. Once we resituate Batson in the equal protection context, however, the case begins to look like an outlier from
the other areas of law in which the Court allows consideration of
race in order to promote diversity.209 Although the Court has banned
affirmative action in government hiring and contracting,210 it has
repeatedly allowed consideration of race for instrumental purposes
related to diversity and representation.211 For example, the Court
has allowed universities to consider race as a “plus factor” in student admissions, even though that exacts a much higher cost on
excluded students than the consideration would on jurors not chosen
for a particular jury.212 More striking yet, even the more conserva209. One of the few scholars to recognize the connection is John Francis. Francis, supra
note 16, at 345-47, 356 (arguing that Batson contradicts other equal protection doctrine); see
also Tetlow, supra note 130, at 144, 146 (arguing that the Batson cases established the notion
of color blindness as its own constitutional injury, a doctrine which the more conservative
portion of the Court relied upon heavily in the legislative redistricting cases).
210. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.
A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510-11 (1989).
211. See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227 (“It follows from that principle that all
governmental action based on race—a group classification long recognized as ‘in most
circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited’—should be subjected to detailed judicial
inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been
infringed. These ideas have long been central to this Court’s understanding of equal
protection, and holding ‘benign’ state and federal racial classifications to different standards
does not square with them.” (citations omitted)). In contrast, in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court
held that race could be used as one factor among many as a means of achieving the compelling
purpose of increasing diversity in a student body. 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003). Similarly, in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, Justice Powell positively cited Harvard’s (and
a number of other universities’) “race-plus” program as a means of constitutionally taking
account of race in university admissions. 438 U.S. 265, 316-18 (1978).
212. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341 (noting that the University’s race-conscious admissions
policies were not unduly harmful to nonminority students).
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tive majority of the Court has allowed legislators sorting voters into
legislative districts (a process quite similar to jury selection) to
assume that race predicts voting behavior so long as they are not too
obvious about it.213 Only the Batson Court rejected any consideration of race despite the existence of a countervailing constitutional
principle promoting diversity—that of the fair cross section doctrine.
The breakdown of votes in the Supreme Court’s Batson line of
cases also presents a strange ideological reversal of the normal
discussions on color blindness versus diversity. Only in the jury
cases do the more conservative Justices argue that race consciousness does not equate to racism, and that diversity is necessary to
combat the racism inherent in our society and thus in our jury
system.214 Stranger still, only in the jury cases do the more liberal
justices deny the salience of race and proclaim the importance of
aspirational color blindness as a model to the cynical public.215
Neither side has ever conceded its inconsistency on these issues.216

213. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (holding that redistricting establishes an equal
protection claim only when a district’s shape was so irregular that no other reason besides
race could be asserted as a motivation for the particular change); see Tetlow, supra note 130,
at 135.
214. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 148 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“Nor is the value of the peremptory challenge to the litigant diminished when the peremptory
is exercised in a gender-based manner. We know that like race, gender matters.”); id. at 160
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Women were categorically excluded from juries because of doubt that
they were competent; women are stricken from juries by peremptory challenge because of
doubt that they are well disposed to the striking party’s case. There is discrimination and
dishonor in the former, and not in the latter.” (citation omitted)).
215. See Muller, supra note 33, at 134-35 (describing how the Justices flip-flop on the
subject of whether difference matters). The more liberal justices writing the majority opinions
in Batson and its progeny embrace the idea that race can never predict belief, even though
they argue strongly that it does in other contexts. Tetlow, supra note 130, at 149-50. The
dissenters in the Batson line of cases argue strenuously that race and gender do matter to
jury verdicts, citing empirical evidence of that fact, but then return to color-blind ideology in
other contexts. Id.
216. Only Justice O’Connor acknowledged the inconsistency, in part by claiming that the
Batson rule “in effect, is a special rule of relevance, a statement about what this Nation
stands for, rather than a statement of fact.” J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 149 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(quoting Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 941-42 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
And only Justice Kennedy actually remained consistent in advocating for color blindness in
both the jury selection cases and in the affirmative action and legislative districting cases. See
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 247 (2003); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 632; Georgia v. McCollum, 505
U.S. 42, 43 (1992); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 401 (1991).
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In comparison to the Batson cases, the Supreme Court has come
to different conclusions about the constitutional value of diversity
in the cases governing affirmative action in student admission. In
Grutter v. Bollinger, a narrow majority of the Court allowed the University of Michigan Law School the leeway to consider race as a
“plus factor” in order to promote diversity in its student body as an
important educational tool.217 The viewpoint that racial experience
matters does not, the Court argued, equate to a belief that minorities always represent a particular viewpoint. It rebuts such stereotypes:
Just as growing up in a particular region or having particular
professional experiences is likely to affect an individual’s views,
so too is one’s own, unique experience of being a racial minority
in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still
matters. The Law School has determined, based on its experience and expertise, that a “critical mass” of underrepresented
minorities is necessary to further its compelling interest in
securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body.218

Diversity, the majority reasoned, increases the likelihood that different viewpoints will be represented during classroom debates and
that stereotypes will be broken down.219
The dissenters, however, portrayed affirmative action as the
denial of university admission to an individual based on his or her
race.220 Diversity amounts, they argued in this case and others, to
an unconstitutional determination that race equates to a particular
belief structure.221 It reifies societal beliefs that race does and
217. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
218. Id. at 333.
219. Id. at 330 (“These benefits are substantial. As the District Court emphasized, the Law
School’s admissions policy promotes ‘cross-racial understanding,’ helps to break down racial
stereotypes, and ‘enables [students] to better understand persons of different races.’ These
benefits are ‘important and laudable,’ because ‘classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited,
and simply more enlightening and interesting’ when the students have ‘the greatest possible
variety of backgrounds.’ ” (citations omitted)).
220. Id. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“With respect to the remaining 15% to 20% of the
seats [those not in the top percent of LSAT scores], race is likely outcome determinative for
many members of minority groups. That is where the competition becomes tight and where
any given applicant’s chance of admission is far smaller if he or she lacks minority status.”).
221. See id. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657. Contra Shaw, 509 U.S.
at 678 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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should matter.222 And it denies an important benefit to an applicant
on the basis of his or her race.223
In the jury selection cases, each side of the Court made similar
arguments, but on opposite sides of the issue.224 The more conservative Justices argued in dissent that race predicts belief without
guaranteeing it. “It is not merely ‘stereotyping’ to say that these
differences [in racial experience] may produce a difference in
outlook which is brought to the jury room.”225 Racial diversity
matters to jury deliberations, particularly by guarding against the
conscious and unconscious racism of white jurors.226 The dissenters
pointed out that for decades before Batson, the Court made clear in
the fair cross-section cases that the idea that race and gender might
matter to jury deliberations stems from the irrational and unconstitutional certainty that it will always matter.227 The Court managed
222. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“The question itself is the stigma—because either racial discrimination did play a role, in
which case the person may be deemed ‘otherwise unqualified,’ or it did not, in which case
asking the question itself unfairly marks those blacks who would succeed without
discrimination.”).
223. Id. at 361, 368.
224. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist followed this line of thinking for those cases
in which they voted, dissenting or concurring. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. 511 U.S. 127
(1994); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991); Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). They also dissented in Grutter. Justices Powell, White,
Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall were in the majority in the Batson line of cases as they left
the Court. Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer were in the majority in the Batson line of
cases as they joined the Court, and were in the majority in Grutter. Justice O’Connor
straddled the middle, dissenting in McCollum and concurring in J.E.B., but acknowledging
that the Batson rule is an aspirational legal fiction more than a fact, because race “matters.”
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 146 (O’Connor, J., concurring); McCollum, 505 U.S. at 62 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting). As described earlier, Justice Kennedy remained consistent in advocating for color
blindness in both the jury selection cases and in the affirmative action and legislative
districting cases.
225. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 156 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
226. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 68 (“It is by now clear that conscious and unconscious racism
can affect the way white jurors perceive minority defendants and the facts presented at their
trials, perhaps determining the verdict of guilt or innocence.”); see also J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 148
(citing empirical studies indicating that gender, just like race, matters in juror selection).
227. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 157-58 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court also spends time
establishing that the use of sex as a proxy for particular views or sympathies is unwise and
perhaps irrational. The opinion stresses the lack of statistical evidence to support the widely
held belief that, at least in certain types of cases, a juror’s sex has some statistically
significant predictive value as to how the juror will behave. This assertion seems to place the
Court in opposition to its earlier Sixth Amendment ‘fair cross-section’ cases.” (citing Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 532 n.12 (1975))); Peters v. Kiff, 207 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972)
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to make this argument while carefully avoiding race or gender
essentialism. One does not have to believe in biologically ingrained
difference to understand that the experience of race and gender
discrimination often impacts ideology.228
The more liberal majority in the Batson cases, however, argued
that the idea that race predicts belief in jury deliberations is
irrational, and based upon “open hostility or from some hidden and
unarticulated fear.”229 To make the counterfactual claim that race
never predicts belief, the Court engaged in a straw man argument.
Instead of addressing whether lawyers exercising peremptories
could permissibly guess that race or gender might predict belief, the
Court reasoned that lawyers cannot constitutionally presume that
race or gender will necessarily determine belief.230 Batson redefined
jury selection as a determination of qualification—a “person’s race
simply ‘is unrelated to his fitness as a juror.’ ”231 Many scholars
perpetuate these arguments by equating race consciousness in jury
selection to racism.232
(“When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury service,
the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of human
experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable.” (citing Ballard v.
United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946) (“[A] distinct quality is lost if either sex is
excluded.”))).
228. See Abramson, supra note 56, at 128-29; Johnson, supra note 195, at 1706-07; Kuhn,
supra note 112, at 237-40; Jennie Rhine, Note, The Jury: A Reflection of the Prejudices of the
Community, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1417, 1429 (1969).
229. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (explaining that the only
“rational way” for a lawyer to act is “without the use of classifications based on ancestry or
skin color”).
230. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the
prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption
that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case against a
black defendant.”); see Muller, supra note 33, at 101-02.
231. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (emphasis added) (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,
227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
232. Scholars often make this argument while at the same time espousing the value of
diversity and failing to acknowledge the hypocrisy of arguing that race matters to jury deliberations, but that lawyers who agree are racist. See, e.g., Brand, supra note 14, at 519, 523
(decrying “discriminatory peremptory challenges” and arguing for the inclusion of minority
jurors because race matters). Charles Ogletree, for example, admits that race and gender
sometimes do matter, and that such strikes can be “in keeping with the litigant’s goals, and
would simply be part of effective advocacy were it not entirely repugnant to the values and
standards of the Constitution, values that should and do override the litigant’s interest in
winning.” Ogletree, supra note 109, at 1104. If the current rule banned the dilution of
minority voting strength on juries, then such strikes might be considered discriminatory, or
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In reality, however, jury selection involves no presumption of
certainty. Peremptory challenges guess at juror ideology; they do not
declare it to be true.233 The Batson Court in effect banned the
empirically proven fact that race and gender sometimes do correlate
to belief.234 Here is another way to describe the strangeness of
Batson’s reasoning: if we define racist jury selection as a lawyer’s
irrational and inaccurate stereotyping, then this is conduct that
comes with its own inherent penalty. Lawyers whose racial use of
peremptory challenges has no merit only hurt their own cause.235
They strike the wrong jurors. Instead, we are really worried about
correct stereotypes. Fundamentally, we want to prevent people from
wiping out representation of those views on the jury.236
Starting with Shaw v. Reno, the Supreme Court engaged in a
similar debate in the legislative redistricting cases about the permissibility of using race as a predictor of voting behavior.237 In that
case, a conservative majority of the Court relied on Batson to ban
legislators from drawing legislative districting lines in a way that
would seem obviously racially motivated.238 But even that conservative opinion stopped short of the absolute color blindness of Batson:
the Court held only that race could not be the predominant factor
for the shape of a particular district.239 And the Justices again
at least illegal. At the moment, however, the Court bans strikes conducted on the supposedly
false notion that race affects belief.
233. See Alschuler, supra note 83, at 168-69 (differentiating between the prosecutor’s
attempt to guess at the most favorable jury from Batson’s contention that the prosecutor
presumes the incapacity of black jurors). The reasons for exercising peremptory challenges
have become the stuff of lore and tradition, as well as the basis of careers as expensive jury
consultants. See id.
234. Ford, supra note 87, at 390; Fulero & Penrod, supra note 205, at 232-34 (reviewing the
“folklore” of jury selection techniques); Muller, supra note 33, at 106 (“[R]ace and gender are
rational, even if grossly imperfect, proxies for perspective.”); Saks, supra note 205, at 9-14.
235. Muller, supra note 33, at 101-02 (stating that the Batson Court’s decision implied that
a Batson error is by definition harmless because of the Court’s strange insistence that juror
race can never matter); id. at 122-23 (arguing that Batson’s own logic suggests that it creates
harmless error: if race and gender do not matter to jury deliberations, as the Court reasons,
then there is no injury to the defendant).
236. Muller, supra note 33, at 137 (“This, then, is the second, more sensible conclusion that
should flow from the Batson opponents’ commitment to the theory of difference: a reliable
verdict becomes the consensus of a jury whose membership incorporates those distinctive
perspectives.”).
237. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
238. Id. at 649.
239. Id. at 646. The Justices in the majority of the Shaw line of cases included O’Connor,
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revealed a reversal of opinions on the subject of whether race should
matter.240
The more conservative majority in the Shaw cases gleefully relied
on the Batson cases for the proposition that race is irrelevant to
electoral behavior, and the notion that black voters “share the same
political interests” is merely an “impermissible racial stereotype[ ]”241 based on the “demeaning notion that members of the defined racial groups ascribe to certain ‘minority views’ that must be
different from those of other citizens.”242 They pointed out the
hypocrisy of the dissenters who argued so forcefully about the
irrelevance of race in the flurry of Batson cases leading up to Shaw
in 1992.243 And although the conservative Justices did not explain
their own flip-flop on these issues, they began to come around more
fully to the notion of color blindness in the jury cases.244
The more liberal dissenters in the Shaw cases expressed outrage
at the idea that race could not predict voting behavior. They attempted to distinguish the jury cases by arguing that it is “irrational to assume that a [black] person is not qualified ... to serve as a
juror,” although “[i]t is neither irrational, nor invidious, however, to
assume that a black resident of a particular community is a
Democrat if reliable statistical evidence discloses that 97% of the
blacks in that community vote in Democratic primary elections.”245
Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist. The dissenters included Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Souter.
240. Id. at 649.
241. Id. at 647-48 (citing peremptory challenge cases).
242. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 914 (1995) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
243. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 968-69 (1996) (“We cannot agree with the dissenters that
racial stereotyping that we have scrutinized closely in the context of jury service can pass
without justification in the context of voting. If the promise of the Reconstruction Amendments, that our Nation is to be free of state-sponsored discrimination, is to be upheld, we
cannot pick and choose between the basic forms of political participation in our efforts to
eliminate unjustified racial stereotyping by government actors.” (citations omitted)).
244. In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), for example, Justice Kennedy
expressed horror at the idea that group affiliations could matter to jury deliberations: “It is
important to recognize that a juror sits not as a representative of a racial or sexual group but
as an individual citizen. Nothing would be more pernicious to the jury system than for society
to presume that persons of different backgrounds go to the jury room to voice prejudice.” Id.
at 153-54 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
245. Bush, 517 U.S. at 1031 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter tried a different tack
by arguing that race should not play a role in jury deliberations, as compared to elections,
because jury deliberations do not represent arguments over social values, but are rather
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Of course, peremptory challenges do not determine qualification to
serve on a jury any more than legislative districting predicts
certainty about voting behavior.
The dissenters in the Shaw case also pointed out a countervailing
set of values that require legislators to think about race—the Voting
Rights Act’s prohibitions on vote dilution.246 But those Justices
ignored the parallel command in the jury selection context. The
Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement also rests on the
idea that racial and gender diversity matter to jury deliberations,
creating the odd situation of arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids what the Sixth Amendment requires.247
Because the worlds of constitutional law and criminal procedure
do not sufficiently communicate, it has gone strangely unnoticed
that the Batson cases constitute absolute outliers within equal
protection law. The Batson rule creates the strictest possible
prohibition on the consideration of race, even when used to promote
jury diversity. It proves far stricter than the cautious allowance of
diversity in educational admissions, even though the harm to
excluded students seems far greater than the harm to excluded
jurors.248 It proves stricter even than the Court’s requirement that
legislatures not make it too obvious that they thought about race in
legislative districting.249

“neutral,” “impartial,” and “objective[ ].” Id. at 1051 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting). As Eric Muller
argues, this notion that juries are black boxes turning out scientific verdicts without need for
debate over social values is both demonstrably false and underlies the more conservative
refusal to properly review criminal convictions on appeal. Muller, supra note 33, at 137 (“The
image of the jury as a scientific laboratory is fatally incomplete; in order to fulfill its central
mission of producing reliable verdicts, a criminal jury must incorporate and represent the
distinctive views of the community.”).
246. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 683-84 (Souter, J., dissenting) (pointing out that legislators must
consider race in order to avoid violating the Voting Rights Act). Regarding affirmative action
in admissions cases, moreover, the majority argued that the First Amendment carves out
leeway for universities to make decisions protected by academic freedom. Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
247. See supra note 201.
248. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (2003) (allowing consideration of race as a factor in admissions so long as it acts as one factor among many, or so long as an applicant receives
sufficiently individualized review).
249. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642 (holding that a district whose shape was so irregular that no
other reason besides race could be asserted as a motivation for the particular redistricting
establishes an equal protection claim).
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Stranger yet, Batson represents the ultimate triumph of color
blindness in a series of cases authored by the left of the Court. I
have no evidence of why that occurred and can only speculate that,
in the tangle of values governing jury selection, it seemed important
to create the most absolute restriction on the racial skewing of
juries. The problem for the Court was that the reasoning of the rule
belied its effectiveness.250 It rests on an exaggeration of the meritocratic nature of jury selection.251 Worse yet, it represents a state of
denial about the ways that race still matters all too much to our
criminal justice system.252
The Sixth Amendment test I propose to regulate jury selection
should not violate Equal Protection because it is narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling governmental interest. Jury diversity serves
a clearly constitutional purpose justifying race consciousness, one
rooted in protecting the defendant’s Sixth Amendment guarantee of
an “impartial jury” and the fair functioning of the criminal justice
system. The test does not impose racial quotas or allow diversity to
trump individualized concerns about bias, and thus does not
pretend that racial diversity alone defines impartiality.253 The test
simply recognizes the fair cross-section principle as an important
tool to select a fair jury, and prioritizes those categories of diversity
previously recognized by the Court as the most important, given our
history of discrimination against them.
250. See, e.g., Brand, supra note 14, at 620-21 (noting that Batson and its progeny presume
the existence of a color-blind society at great cost to the rule’s effectiveness); Roberta K.
Flowers, Does It Cost Too Much? A “Difference” Look at J.E.B. v. Alabama, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 491, 532-33 (1995) (arguing that the Court’s claim that gender does not matter to jury
deliberations is simply counterfactual); Herman, supra note 11, at 1818-19 (stating that the
Court’s color-blind reasoning values a jurors’ rights against being stereotyped over the defendant’s rights to a fair trial); Johnson, supra note 169, at 69-70; Leipold, supra note 201, at
991-92; Muller, supra note 33, at 116-21, 131-48 (arguing that the Batson rule defines itself
as harmless error because its reasoning pretends that jury diversity is irrelevant to a defendant’s rights, and proposing a Sixth Amendment analysis as a stronger basis for the rule).
251. See supra Part I.B.
252. This state of denial then infects all of the rest of constitutional criminal procedure in
ways the left of the Court often complains of. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 32122 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (excoriating the Court for its refusal to address the
demonstrable racism of juries on average); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 39 (1986)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the Court for its refusal
to acknowledge that racism often infects jury deliberations).
253. See infra Part III.B on why diversity cannot supplant impartiality as the ultimate
constitutional goal.
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2. Prioritizing the Rights of Third Parties Against Stereotyping
over the Rights of Defendants to an Impartial Jury
Ultimately, all this purported worry about color blindness in jury
selection clearly has nothing to do with the quest for an impartial
jury: it focuses instead on the rights of potential jurors.254 The Court
acknowledged this in McCollum when applying the Batson rule to
defendants themselves, holding that “if race stereotypes are the
price for acceptance of a jury panel as fair, we reaffirm today that
such a price is too high to meet the standard of the Constitution.”255
The Court has decided that the right against stereotyping of potential jurors, who are third parties in the criminal justice system,
essentially trumps the right of defendants to an impartial jury and
the right of the public to a fair criminal justice system.256 Ironically,
the Court proves far more solicitous about the rights of jurors than
the rights of students, who can be excluded from universities based
on their race in the name of diversity, despite the fact that the
admissions process purports to be a meritocracy in a way that jury
selection does not.
Given the Sixth Amendment imperative to protect the defendant’s
right to an impartial jury, the Court’s willingness to go out so far
onto an equal protection ledge to protect jurors seems misplaced.
254. Herman, supra note 11, at 1817-18; Tetlow, supra note 18, at 1730-31; see Muller,
supra note 33, at 120-21; Underwood, supra note 104, at 726-27, 742-45.
255. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (relying on Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991)).
256. The Court in the Batson line of cases also relied on a more important sounding
argument: the right of citizens to be chosen or rejected from a jury without regard to race. See,
e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (“As long ago as Strauder, therefore, the Court
recognized that by denying a person participation in jury service on account of his race, the
State unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded juror.” (citing Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879))). This would present the equal protection issue far more
squarely, in a way similar to the claims made by students to an admission decision devoid of
consideration of race. The difference, however, is one of standing. Because jurors are third
parties to the criminal appeals brought by defendants, they must suffer “injury-in-fact” and
demonstrate a nexus between their rights and the interest of the litigant. See Underwood,
supra note 104, at 756 (describing the test but arguing that third-party standing should
belong to jurors). Although citizens have a right to access jury service, they do not have a right
to be chosen for any particular trial jury. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 424 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Indeed, most are not selected, and for entirely superficial reasons. Accordingly,
the Court instead created standing based on stereotyping alone—a doctrine excoriated by
those same Justices in dissent from the Shaw line of cases. See supra notes 245-52 and
accompanying text.

1916

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1859

Though it is worth considering the harm that racial stereotypes
cause potential jurors, that harm should not trump the rights of
defendants. It is also far from clear that jurors do suffer serious
injury from race-conscious peremptory challenges.
There is a difference between the stigma caused by categorical
exclusions from the venire, which the Court overturned one hundred
years before Batson, and the individualized use of peremptory challenges to guess at bias. The Supreme Court struck down the exclusion of blacks from jury service in Strauder v. West Virginia,
describing the stigmatic injury of such an exclusion to black people
as “practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion
of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is
an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal
justice which the law aims to secure to all others.”257 It is far more
difficult to argue, however, that the stereotyping of peremptory
challenges, made in the course of jury selection based entirely on
guesswork and often done by each side against different races,
creates the same kind of stigma as the statutory exclusion of black
people or women from jury service.258
Unlike university admissions or government hiring, the jury selection process does not purport to be a meritocracy. And although
methods of exercising peremptory strikes differ, for the most part,
potential jurors experience the exercise of strikes against the
majority of the venire for entirely silent reasons.259 Arguments over
Batson, or the proposed Sixth Amendment test, should happen at
the bench out of earshot. No one is labeled “too stupid or biased to
serve on a particular jury.”260 The vast majority of potential jurors
257. 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879).
258. Ultimately the Batson cases rely not just on the argument that race does not matter,
but that it should not matter. Justice Kennedy expressed this view most eloquently in his
concurrence to J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.:
It is important to recognize that a juror sits not as a representative of a racial
or sexual group but as an individual citizen. Nothing would be more pernicious
to the jury system than for society to presume that persons of different
backgrounds go to the jury room to voice prejudice.
511 U.S. 127, 153-54 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring). However, it is unclear how this message is communicated.
259. Babcock, supra note 99, at 553-54. It would also be easier to convert jury selection to
a system in which jurors are not aware of who struck them or why than it would be to end
peremptory challenges to avoid that injury.
260. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 497 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that
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are not chosen for a jury, and most are perfectly thrilled to avoid the
economic and emotional cost of serving. Unlike job and college
applicants, jurors are not volunteers. They are required by law to
give up their time, and thus often to lose wages or face legal
consequences.261 Fundamentally, given the cost of jury service to
many citizens, Sheri Johnson observes, “[a] flat assertion that the
psychological pain of being excluded on the basis of race always
outweighs the benefits seems to me either extremely dogmatic or
paternalistic.”262 Above all, most potential jurors would be surprised
at the thought that their rights against certain stereotypes, during
a process designed for instrumental reasons to be awash in stereotypes, would trump the quest for an impartial jury.263
When minority jurors walk away from the selection of an allwhite jury, some will experience injury, but that injury is born of a
collective loss of power rather than personal stereotyping. In other
words, a minority juror struck from a jury that remains racially
diverse for the most part probably does not care whether race
factored into the reasons that she was not chosen.264 A Sixth
Amendment test that better regulates jury diversity, even though
it would no longer ban race consciousness, would reduce this
collective injury.
In this sense, jury selection resembles legislative redistricting
more than affirmative action in admissions. Potential jurors are
sorted into different trial juries in the way that voters are sorted

potential jurors are so labeled); see Johnson, supra note 169, at 77 (arguing that it is “hard
to believe” that a person excluded based on race would experience his exclusion as a
“judgment of unfitness for citizenship” (citing Underwood, supra note 104, at 746)).
261. Re, supra note 49, at 1584 (stating that jury service is mandatory and at the time of
the government’s choosing). Punishment for refusal to serve ranges from fines to
imprisonment. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1866(g) (2012) provides that “[a]ny person who fails
to show good cause for noncompliance with a [jury] summons may be fined not more than
$1,000, imprisoned not more than three days, ordered to perform community service, or any
combination thereof.” See also STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE
AMERICAN COURTROOM 14 (1994). Most Americans sent summonses never appear for a
combination of reasons: the summonses were never delivered, they ask to be and are excused,
or they ignore the summonses. Two-thirds of the prospective jurors who do appear do not
serve because they ask to be and are excused, lawyers challenge them, or they are never sent
to a courtroom. See id. at 243 n.1.
262. Johnson, supra note 169, at 77.
263. Id. at 51.
264. Id. at 89-90.
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into districts.265 They do not lose their right to serve if they are not
chosen for a particular jury. Although they will not vote in that
particular case, no one has a right to serve on any particular jury.266
As several scholars have argued, what matters more to the makeup
of juries is the ability of minorities to vote on juries in a proportional
way, which is the same goal of remedies for vote dilution.267 If we
could obtain that kind of diversity at the expense of some unspoken
race consciousness during jury selection by permitting judges to
believe race matters in order to enforce diversity, the price seems
well worth paying.
Finally, the Batson cases describe most passionately an even
more abstract constitutional harm: the expressive harm that racial
stereotypes cause to the reputation of the judicial system.268 “Race
discrimination within the courtroom raises serious questions as to
the fairness of the proceedings conducted there.”269 This is a
different injury than arguing that all-white juries call into question
the legitimacy of the system.270 If the public links legitimacy with
diversity, the Court argues that the public is gravely mistaken.271
Instead, the criminal justice system should teach the public that
race does not matter by engaging in that myth itself.272
265. See Gerken, supra note 22, at 1139 n.104.
266. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 424 (1991) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
267. See Gerken, supra note 22, at 1139 (describing the concept of “second-order diversity,”
and arguing that the relevant issue is diversity across the spectrum of juries, rather than
“first-order diversity” within each individual jury); infra Part III.B. Of course, unlike voters,
all of whom receive a district, most potential jurors do not serve on a trial jury, though they
may be called again.
268. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1986). The Court also relied on the entirely
circular argument that racial use of peremptory challenges projects lawlessness into the
system because the litigants are not following the Batson rule. Violation of Batson “casts
doubt over the obligation of the parties, the jury, and indeed the court to adhere to the law
throughout the trial of the cause.” Powers, 499 U.S. at 412.
269. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991).
270. There is a different, more results-oriented issue of public legitimacy that depends on
the actual diversity of the juries. That argument is made by those who promote diversity, and
is discussed in Part III.B.
271. Muller, supra note 33, at 124 (suggesting that the public’s belief is mistaken);
Underwood, supra note 104, at 749 (noting that although the stereotypes of the public about
the importance of racial makeup of juries “cannot properly serve as the foundation of any legal
rule or right, they can nevertheless undermine public confidence in the fairness of verdicts
and thus increase the harm resulting from race-based jury selection”).
272. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594-95 (1976). The two halves of the Court also flipflopped in their consideration of “expressive harm” in the legislative districting cases.
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The Court is in the peculiar situation of worrying that the harm
to public confidence in the criminal justice system stems from the
public noticing that lawyers believe that race matters when
choosing juries.273 Of course, the reality is that the public entirely
agrees that race matters to jury deliberations. As the proponents of
diversity often note, the public often measures the legitimacy of
juries by their racial makeup.274 The Court’s argument literally
prioritizes the desire to persuade a skeptical public of the value of
color blindness over the right of the defendant, and indeed, of the
public, to actual racial justice.275
In McCollum, for example, the Court cited riots sparked by the
acquittal of police officers charged with racial beating as an example
of the importance of preserving public confidence in the criminal
justice system.276 After a change of venue from Los Angeles to
Considering race during districting, the conservatives argued, would just reify racial bloc
voting. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647-48 (1993). Justices O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas were in the majority in Shaw. Id. Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens,
and Souter dissented. Id. In Miller v. Johnson, Justice Kennedy joined the conservative
majority and Justices Ginsberg and Breyer joined the dissenters. 515 U.S. 900, 902 (1995).
Again, although Justice O’Connor at least acknowledged the ideological difficulty of deciding
whether race and gender matter in the jury cases, only Justice Kennedy voted consistently
in favor of color blindness in both sets of cases. See supra note 216.
273. The dissenters in the Batson cases (like the liberal dissenters in the Shaw cases)
derided the elusive concept of expressive harm. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 427 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“ ‘Injury in perception’ would seem to be the very antithesis of ‘injury in fact.’ ”).
The dissenters also ridiculed the abstract, unproven nature of the harm. Id. at 426 (“The
Court must, of course, speak in terms of the perception of fairness rather than its reality.”).
274. Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 DUKE L.J. 704, 704 (1995) (“Few
statements are more likely to evoke disturbing images of American criminal justice than this
one: ‘The defendant was tried by an all-white jury.’ ”); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 22, at 361-64
(citing political legitimacy as one of three bases for a representative jury, along with
community consensus and juror rights); Nancy J. King, The Effects of Race-Conscious Jury
Selection on Public Confidence in the Fairness of Jury Proceedings: An Empirical Puzzle, 31
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1177, 1186-90 (1994) (surveying empirical evidence for this claim); Massaro,
supra note 33, at 517-18; Muller, supra note 33, at 144 (“[C]riminal verdicts are not just
findings of historical fact, but expressions of an inescapably subjective consensus reached
among jurors who bring discrete viewpoints and perspectives to their deliberations.
Representation of these discrete viewpoints on the jury enhances the reliability of the criminal
verdict, both by guaranteeing that the verdict will reflect a true social consensus, and by
convincing the community as a whole that the verdict is worthy of respect.”).
275. See Johnson, supra note 169, at 81 (noting that the Batson cases’ reliance on public
perceptions of legitimacy “completely ignores the public interest in racially unbiased results,
just as it ignores the defendant’s interest in racially unbiased results”).
276. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 49 (1992) (citing Alschuler, supra note 83, at 19596).
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predominately white Ventura County, the defendant police officers
charged with beating Rodney King faced a jury without any black
members, which then acquitted.277 After the resulting riots, a more
racially diverse federal jury convicted the defendants of most charges.278 Because the beatings occurred on videotape, the case involved
less a dispute over what happened than what it meant under the
law.279 The riots did not result from outrage that the lawyers
choosing a jury might have believed that race mattered. No one
seemed persuaded, as the Court would wish, that the race of the
jurors had nothing to do with the verdict. It was the very absence of
African American jurors that made the verdict seem inevitable.
Let me make a more important point. The outrage and riots
occurred because the verdict was so outrageously wrong. If the
acquittal of so public an injustice had been handed down by a jury
with one or two black members it might have softened the blow, but
I doubt by much. And conversely, if the mostly white Ventura
County jury had convicted, there would have been no outrage at the
lack of proper diversity. Impartiality matters more than color
blindness for defendants, for the fair functioning of the criminal
justice system, for public perception of the system, and even, I bet,
for most jurors subject to potential stereotyping.

277. See INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 3-17 (1991) (describing the Rodney
King incident and the evidence of the defendants’ guilt); Robert Reinhold, Surprised, Police
React Slowly as Violence Spreads, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at A1 (describing the resulting
riot, which some consider one of the most violent episodes in U.S. history). Los Angeles Mayor
Tom Bradley stated that he was “outraged” by the verdicts. Jane Fritsch, Los Angeles Mayor
Criticizes Chief for Slow Action on Riot, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1992, at B9. President George
H.W. Bush found it “hard to understand how the verdicts could possibly square with the
video.” Richard A. Serrano & Jim Newton, 3 King Case Defendants Notified of U.S. Inquiry,
L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1992, at A1.
278. See United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769 (C.D. Cal. 1993), vacated in part on other
grounds, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994); Linda Deutsch, Jury’s Diversity Proved the Key,
SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 18, 1993, at A3.
279. Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 776-77 (“A meaningful understanding of the events [the
videotape] depicts required the explanation of witnesses who are experts in law enforcement.
At trial the Government and defendants agreed that much of the officers’ conduct was
justified and legal, yet vigorously disputed whether and when their behavior became illegal.”).
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III. PROTECTING DIVERSITY WITHOUT LOSING FOCUS ON
IMPARTIALITY: IN DEFENSE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
Having defended jury diversity to the hilt, I now need to answer
the question of why I cling to the preservation of peremptory
challenges at all. The obvious solution to the problem of lawyers
skewing jury diversity would be to end peremptory challenges
altogether, as England did.280 This would protect diversity far more
effectively than any attempt to regulate peremptory challenges
possibly could. Having explained why I would change the law, let
me address why I would not go further.
I defend the practice of lawyers selecting juries because I still
believe that the ultimate goal is an impartial jury, not just a diverse
one. Both diversity and peremptory challenges constitute the most
important tools in the quest for impartiality. It is true that the tool
of peremptories interferes with the tool of diversity, but my proposal
attempts to harness both. Sixth Amendment regulation would allow
judges to value the instrumental role of a diverse jury to protect
impartiality, which allows lawyers to use peremptory challenges to
root out individually biased jurors.
The growing number of reformers who propose to end peremptory
challenges offer three very different reasons for doing so. First,
many scholars and a few Supreme Court Justices would end
peremptories in order to end any possibility of Batson error.281 For
280. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33 § 118(1) (Eng.); see 2 LAW REFORM COMM.,
PARLIAMENT OF VICTORIA, JURY SERVICE IN VICTORIA—FINAL REPORT, ch. 5, p. 165 (Dec. 1997)
(showing majority support among English barristers for a system without peremptory
challenges in 1993 study). England, however, does not require unanimous juries. Emil J. Bove
III, Note, Preserving the Value of Unanimous Criminal Jury Verdicts in Anti-Deadlock
Instructions, 97 GEO. L.J. 251, 265 (2008); see also Alschuler, supra note 83, at 157 (“Arbitrary
exclusions from jury service have no place in a constitutional system grounded on concepts
of equality and individual worth.”); Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested
Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1182-83 (1995); Hoffman, supra note 4; Ogletree, supra
note 109, at 1147-48 (proposing ending peremptories only for the state). England has
eliminated peremptory challenges. Bray, supra note 99, at 522.
281. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 231, 273 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that
in light of Batson’s ineffectiveness, it is “necessary to reconsider Batson’s test and the
peremptory challenge system as a whole”); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-07 (1986)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (proposing ending peremptories for both sides, and rejecting
scholarly argument that peremptories should be ended just for the prosecutor); Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 246 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (arguing that equal protection
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them, the importance of color-blind jury selection far outweighs the
use of challenges by both sides to improve the impartiality of the
jury.282 Lawyers would no longer be able to stereotype jurors if they
had no opportunity to do so. Of course, this color-blind reasoning
mirrors the soft foundations of the Batson rule, discussed above,
and takes an even greater tax on impartiality.283 It would be like
replacing merit selection of judges with random selection in order
to ensure that a judicial candidate’s race was never considered.
Most scholars, however, urge ending peremptories in order to
protect jury diversity, not color blindness. A system closer to random
selection would necessarily result in more jury diversity than a system that allows lawyers the opportunity to eliminate minorities.284
These reformers would end peremptories because they believe that
race does matter, not because they pretend it does not.285 In the

might compel the end of peremptory challenges); see also, Alschuler, supra note 83, at 157
(“Arbitrary exclusions from jury service have no place in a constitutional system grounded on
concepts of equality and individual worth.”); Amar, supra note 280, at 1182-83; Raymond J.
Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369 (1992)
(authored by the Senior Judge on the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania); Hoffman, supra note 4 (authored by a Colorado state court judge); Melilli,
supra note 14, at 502-03; Page, supra note 115, at 245-46; Case Comment, supra note 68 at
174-75 (noting that peremptory challenges violate the Sixth Amendment by reducing diversity
and violate equal protection law by allowing irrational and arbitrary decision making).
282. See Alschuler, supra note 83, at 170 (“Peremptory challenges ensure the selection of
jurors on the basis of insulting stereotypes without substantially advancing the goal of
making juries more impartial. The Equal Protection Clause forbids the arbitrary classification of human beings, and peremptory challenges are inherently arbitrary. Even when
exercised on grounds other than race, these challenges are unconstitutional.”); Amar, supra
note 280, at 1183; Melilli, supra note 14, at 501-03; see also Swain, 380 U.S. at 244 (Goldberg,
J., dissenting) (“Were it necessary to make an absolute choice between the right of a
defendant to have a jury chosen in conformity with the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the right to challenge peremptorily, the Constitution compels a choice of the
former.”).
283. Practically speaking, an end to peremptory challenges would almost certainly require
a more rigorous voir dire and use of for-cause challenges, so we cannot avoid the problem of
guessing at people’s beliefs and biases based on superficial information. Ogletree, supra note
109, at 1127.
284. But see Samuel R. Sommers, Determinants and Consequences of Jury Racial Diversity:
Empirical Findings, Implications, and Directions for Future Research, 2 SOC. ISSUES & POL’Y
REV. 65 (2008).
285. Ironically, many of these reformers argue both that diversity matters, and that
lawyers who exercise peremptory challenges in a race conscious way are racist. See Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). That said, avoiding racial stereotyping, regardless of any
need to categorically deny its accuracy, would prove another benefit for these reformers.
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hierarchy of our three constitutional goals, they agree that diversity
trumps color blindness.
These reformers still diverge, however, on the issue of whether
impartiality trumps diversity. Some retain a focus on impartiality
as the ultimate goal, but make the pragmatic argument that diversity standing alone simply provides the best protection for impartiality. They propose various fixes to the jury system to make up for
the end of peremptory challenges.286 I agree philosophically with
these reformers, but ultimately conclude that the benefits of party
participation in jury selection outweigh the benefits of more random
selection.
Other reformers who would end peremptory challenges make the
more provocative argument that diversity simply trumps impartiality. They believe that the role of juries as representative matters
more than the guarantee of juries that are impartial.287 Without
disputing the importance of juries to our notions of democracy, I
disagree with the notion that this role can trump the functional role
of the jury in our criminal justice system. The constitutional notion
of trial by jury, I argue, prioritizes its fair functioning over its role
as a pillar of power sharing and democracy.
A. Why Diversity Is Not Enough
Having already addressed the reasons why color blindness should
not justify ending peremptories, this Section will focus on those
reformers who argue that no lawyerly guessing about bias can ever
substitute for the kind of jury diversity resulting from random
selection. This argument at least maintains the defendant’s right to
an impartial jury as central and recognizes diversity as instrumental. The correctness of the argument depends on facts that are
difficult to measure: the power of diversity to protect impartiality
versus the usefulness of peremptory challenges to eliminate bias.
Yet the question is not simply empirical. Those who would end
peremptories emphasize the subjective and inevitable nature of all

286. These include retaining challenges for the defendant, beefing up for-cause challenges
and/or ending the unanimity requirement for verdicts. See infra Part III.A.
287. Cf. Amar, supra note 280, at 1182.
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human bias, and throw their hands up at the possibility of doing
anything other than balancing it.288
To start with, ending peremptories does not result in perfectly
diverse juries in every community. It is entirely dependent on the
venire of that particular jurisdiction.289 Ending peremptories would
result in more diverse juries in Texas than in Utah.290 And it would
work only on average over time, leaving some juries still quite
homogenous.291 Indeed, some reformers would grapple with this
problem by requiring diversity through affirmative quotas, systems
that would increase the impact of diversity but still suffer from the
problems discussed in this Part.292
288. See Alschuler, supra note 83, at 168-70; Herman, supra note 11, at 1822-23.
289. Alschuler, supra note 83, at 170-71, 205 (noting that ending the peremptory will not
solve the problem when jurisdictions have very little diversity to start with); Cavise, supra
note 129, at 527 (noting that minorities “usually appearing in much smaller numbers ... can
be completely eliminated” with peremptory challenges).
290. See Re, supra note 49, at 1578-79.
291. Gerken, supra note 22, at 1112 (explaining that random selection would not create
perfectly proportional diversity in each jury trial, but only on average).
292. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW (6th ed. 2008) (proposing
legislation guaranteeing a nonwhite defendant a majority of jurors of the same race); Forman,
supra note 68, at 75-83 (proposing selecting juries from separate pools of men and women to
ensure proportional representation of women). These proposals suffer from both pragmatic
and ideological problems. In our increasingly diverse society, we would need to decide which
racial groups require mandatory representation. Johnson, supra note 195, at 1694 (guaranteeing the defendant three “racially similar” jurors out of twelve); Harold McDougall, Note,
The Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531, 548 (1970) (proposing proportional representation); see Howe, supra note 51, at 1198-99 (describing costs of proposals to allow parties to
immunize jurors from peremptory challenges as requiring long voir dire, a large jury pool, and
problems of accuracy); Muller, supra note 33, at 141 (arguing that mandating proportional
representation on every jury is a “vain and impractical hope”). Unlike the proposals to simply
end peremptory challenges, more of the proposals for quotas value racial diversity over all
else, thus missing out on a broader fair cross section of traits such as gender. Because these
proposals would otherwise limit the cross section of the jury by creating quota systems, they
take a tax on other types of diversity. Yet if we did try to mandate inclusion of every relevant
category, even just limiting ourselves to those categories included in antidiscrimination
statutes, we would need to also consider disability, sexual orientation, religion, gender, and
national origin. For a jury of twelve, this becomes an impossible task. Abramson, supra note
56, at 158 (“[W]hat if the handicapped [litigant] is Hispanic, do we now have to recruit for an
Hispanic American who is also handicapped?”). Many of these proposals would require racial
matching between the defendant and jury quotas, thus solving the problem of which
categories to concern ourselves with. Johnson, supra note 195, at 1698. Yet such a system
would be both over- and under-inclusive. It would ignore, for example, the interest that a
white defendant might have in seeking a racially diverse jury in order to seek his own
legitimate goals. Alschuler, supra note 83, at 187-88 (stating that prosecutors tend to strike
black jurors from every jury, regardless of the race of the defendant, because of the perception,
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Ending peremptory challenges would not result in a system of
random selection. Judges would still need to strike the most clearly
biased jurors for cause (those related to the defendant, for example,
or those who witnessed the crime), disqualify some as incompetent
(those unable to perceive or understand the evidence), and excuse
others on hardship grounds (for family, medical, and economic
reasons).293 All of these factors can take an unintentional toll on
diversity.294 Thus, for any specific defendant in any particular
community, the increase of average jury diversity may not nearly be
worth the price of losing all control over jury selection.
Fundamentally, however, ending peremptories would at least increase diversity to some degree, but at what cost to impartiality?
Depriving both sides of peremptory challenges would result in juries
born out by empirical evidence, that black jurors are less likely to convict than white jurors).
Matching the defendant’s race also ignores the rights of minority victims of crime. It would
do nothing to address the endemic racial discrimination against victims. Worse, it would grant
defendants rights that would trump the broader opportunity for a jury impartial towards the
race or gender of the victim.
The extent to which these proposals would interfere with impartiality varies, but is often
left unclear. Many of them, for example, do not explain whether they would also eliminate
peremptory challenges, thus abandoning the possibility of exercising strikes on the nonminority members of the venire. This puts the same heavy reliance on minority members of
the jury to carry the weight of racial justice. See Herman, supra note 11, at 1847 (suggesting
that quotas do more to enhance access of minority jurors, but still impose the responsibility
to address racism on those jurors). Some proposals would do worse. Deborah Ramirez, for example, proposes a system of “peremptory choices,” allowing each side to affirmatively choose
jurors rather than to eliminate them. Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient
Custom of Trial By Jury de Medietate Linguae: A History and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U.
L. REV. 777, 806 (1994). Each side would inevitably pick a pool of the most partial jurors, and
the jury would then be selected from that most biased pool. This would create a far more
partial jury than even a system of random selection.
293. See Howe, supra note 51, at 1193-97 (describing the array of reasons that jury
selection cannot be entirely random).
294. Edward S. Adams & Christian J. Lane, Constructing a Jury That Is Both Impartial
and Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting in Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 703
(1998); Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of
Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707, 714-17 & n.27 (1993) (noting the
disproportionate impact that issues like proficiency in English, conviction or charge of a
felony, and financial hardships including transportation difficulties, inability to afford unreimbursed costs of jury services, and loss of income can have on prospective minority venire
members); Joanna Sobol, Hardship Excuses and Occupational Exemptions: The Impairment
of the “Fair Cross-Section of the Community,” 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 155, 175-76 (1995); Gender
Bias in the Courts Task Force, Gender Bias in the Courts of the Commonwealth Final Report,
7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 705, 786-87 (2001) (describing the disproportionate effect the
lack of childcare accommodations has on women in court at the state level).

1926

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1859

that include both more minority jurors and more biased jurors.295 It
is an enormous gamble to throw out the primary procedural method
to root out bias in the hope that diversity will increase. As Charles
Ogletree worries, at least as to defendants, “It is by no means clear,
either as a policy matter or under the Sixth Amendment, that the
benefits of such a shift would outweigh the risks.”296 Removing peremptory challenges might make the jury look fair as measured by
demographics, but potentially at a significant cost to actual fairness.
On the specific subject of jury racism, the magic question is
whether it matters more to distinguish among the many white
people who will end up on the jury in the hope of rooting out bias, or
instead to accept the luck of the draw in the hopes of having a
greater proportion of minorities on the jury who might change the
conversation. Doing so would put a terrible amount of pressure on
the frequently few minority members of a jury to make up for the
unexamined bias of the majority.297 Moreover, trading away input
into jury selection for a greater share of minority jurors presumes
that those minority jurors will necessarily be motivated to root out
racism, something that is not always true.298
These reformers worry less about the impact on impartiality in
part because they hold a very different idea of the nature of impartiality from Batson’s idea of easily discernable “fitness.”299 Instead,
every juror is inherently partial—subject to the natural human bias

295. Ogletree, supra note 109, at 1145.
296. Id. Professor Ogletree would solve this problem by imposing the end of peremptories
only on the prosecutor. Id. at 1147-48. I address the problem with this approach immediately
below. See also Colbert, supra note 3, at 122 (suggesting that for-cause challenges are an
inadequate replacement for a defendant’s use of peremptories).
297. Herman, supra note 11, at 1845 (“The courts cannot realistically expect that adding
a few more minority jurors will solve the problem of racism. A represented minority is still a
minority.”). See generally Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1261 (2000) (describing difficulties for minority jurors to influence verdicts).
298. Particularly when the alleged victim of a crime is also African American, studies show
that African American jurors sometimes prove far less sympathetic than whites. See Johnson,
supra note 195, at 1634-35. Some minorities, and especially some women, internalize the
prejudices against them and avidly enforce the existing rules, thus making worse jurors than
some of the white and male alternatives. Herman, supra note 11, at 1838 (describing how
black jurors may harbor prejudices against black defendants); see Nancy S. Marder, Note,
Gender Dynamics and Jury Deliberations, 96 YALE L.J. 593, 595-97 (1987) (noting female jury
member conformity to traditional gender roles while serving on juries).
299. Muller, supra note 33, at 123.
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born of differing life experiences.300 Neutrality is impossible because
every juror necessarily possesses what Susan Herman describes as
“bias in its weak sense,” or subconscious beliefs that will affect deliberations, although remaining “comfortably within the range of
fairness.”301 This mirrors the vision of impartiality in the Supreme
Court’s fair cross section cases, in which impartiality is an aspiration, perhaps never fully attainable.302 The best we can possibly do
to counter weak bias is to balance it.303 It then makes sense to end
peremptories because random selection provides our best hope for
this pluralist vision of jury deliberations.304
Dueling peremptory challenges clearly interrupt this balancing
act, and do so by design. Beyond mere demographic diversity,
peremptories interfere with representation of the full array of public
viewpoints by eliminating the extremes and moving towards the
middle.305 In a typical criminal trial, the defense would try to strike
the most conservative jurors or those who had been a victim of the
same crime. The prosecutor would try to strike those most likely to
acquit, from the very liberal to the very sympathetic. The question
is whether juries chosen without peremptories would benefit or
suffer from having the Fox News-watching National Rifle Association member debate the heavily tattooed guy who wants to legalize
marijuana. This might inform and expand juries’ discussions, or it
might destroy the kind of careful and productive deliberations we
desire, resulting in more hung juries at a cost to efficiency.306
The failure of juries to agree on a verdict is not the only problem
with random selection. Empirical evidence demonstrates the diffi300. Herman, supra note 11, at 1822.
301. Id. at 1822-23 (“Jury selection cannot hope to eliminate everyone who is biased if by
bias we refer to subjective viewpoints—group identifications, beliefs, and experiences—that
may consciously or unconsciously affect our judgments.”); see also Minow, supra note 75, at
1207-09.
302. Herman, supra note 11, at 1822; Minow, supra note 75, at 1205-06.
303. See Herman, supra note 11, at 1822; see also Massaro, supra note 33, at 545
(distinguishing between an “impartial” jury and a diverse, and therefore “fair” jury).
304. See Massaro, supra note 33, at 545-47.
305. Howe, supra note 51, at 1215.
306. Retrials often favor the defendant, but also come at a cost to already stretched defense
counsel. And helping a defendant reach ultimate acquittal through delayed retrials and staler
evidence does not necessarily serve the public good. See KENNEDY, supra note 3; Keith A.
Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the Innocence Movement Merges
Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 133, 171-72 (2008).
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culty individuals have in sticking to their beliefs in the context of
group dynamics, particularly in smaller groups the size of juries.307
Some jurors will tend to dominate deliberations and get their way.308
One of the most important tasks lawyers undertake during jury
selection is to eliminate the strong jurors—the ones on either side
of the debate who will dominate deliberations and skew a verdict
their way.309 Leaving these jurors on the jury constitutes an
underappreciated cost of ending peremptory challenges.
Further, even if we accept that impartiality is not absolute, it
goes too far to claim it means nothing. There still exists strong bias,
or the inability to be fair.310 Scott Howe attempts to define impermissible bias (as opposed to unavoidable subjectivity) as “persons
who establish themselves in advance as likely to be strongly influenced by information gained extrajudicially regarding important
factual issues, as likely to decide the case primarily on offensive,
personal considerations or as likely to fail to consider relevant, incourt arguments.”311 There are jurors whose prejudices and discrimination do not allow them to perceive the truth or to do justice, but
who will not state that fact openly in a way that will get them

307. See generally Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-38 (1978) (noting the difficulty of
maintaining a minority viewpoint as jury size decreases); S. E. ASCH, Effects of Group Pressure
upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP AND MEN 177,
183-85 (Harold Guetzkow ed., 1963).
308. See Alex Bavelas et al., Experiments on the Alteration of Group Structure, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 55, 59 (1965) (describing how group members perceived those who
spoke most often to offer the best ideas and guidance); L. Richard Hoffman, Group Problem
Solving, in GROUP PROCESSES 73 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1978) (“[H]e who talks the most is
likely to promote his solution to the group successfully.”); Rita M. James, Status and Competence of Jurors, 64 AM. J. SOC. 563, 564 (1959) (noting that jurors with highest participation
rate or highest level of education were seen as most persuasive); Marder, supra note 298, at
593, 595-96, 598-600 (“One obvious way to maintain power in a group is to monopolize and
control discussion. Those who have power can do the talking; those who lack power must do
the listening.”).
309. See Cathy E. Bennett et al., How to Conduct a Meangingful & Effective Voir Dire in
Criminal Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 659, 679 (1992); Melilli, supra note 14, at 488; see also
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Twelve-Person Federal Civil Jury in Exile, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
691, 693 (2013). As a prosecutor, I struck a law professor who focused on corporations on that
ground, though I had no idea of her ideology.
310. Herman, supra note 11, at 1823. Alschuler calls these “three dollar bill jurors” and
recommends relaxing unanimity requirements so that they can simply be outvoted. Alschuler,
supra note 83, at 207; see infra Part III.A.2.
311. Howe, supra note 51, at 1183.
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struck for cause.312 Examples might include jurors who are prejudiced against the defendant because they have strong feelings about
that individual or the crime charged, those with a strong sympathetic connection to the victim (for example, a juror who works with
abuse victims in a trial charging abuse), jurors who are racist or
sexist, or jurors who have been victims of the charged crime and
struggle with their ability to be fair (though willing to promise to try
and thus avoid a for-cause strike). Jurors prejudiced against the
prosecution might include those who generally hate the government
(for example, tax protestors or militia members), those with family
members who have been convicted of the crime charged who admit
in voir dire that they struggle to be fair, those who do not simply
distrust police but rather refuse to believe any of them, those who
watch CSI: Crime Scene Investigation obsessively and prove unwilling to convict in the absence of DNA evidence,313 those with a
strong prejudice against the victim, and those who do not believe in
certain kinds of crimes (such as domestic violence or marital
rape).314 When we allow that kind of bias onto the jury, we seriously
diminish the chances of a fair verdict. Except for the rare juror who
insists on such bias (usually in an attempt to avoid selection) none
of this bias is easy to remove with for-cause challenges.
Focusing on diversity alone threatens to distract us from the need
to eliminate strong bias, especially racism. Diversity may predict
impartiality, but it is an incredibly rough proxy. Mere racial diversity provides an even rougher proxy.315 Although empirical evidence
312. I do not pretend that these lines are easy to draw, which is precisely why it is too
difficult to rely solely on for-cause challenges. See id. at 1183-85 (giving examples of such bias:
financial stake in the outcome of the case, relationship with a party, or general bias against
the race of a party, the punishment to be imposed, or the crime itself).
313. In my own experience as a prosecutor, these proved to be the jurors who hung juries
despite the impossibility in those trials of the kind of forensic evidence they craved based on
television. The state can always call an expert to explain why such evidence is not possible
given the facts of the case, but that proves an expensive endeavor, and one that requires
anticipating the possible CSI-type evidence that jurors might expect.
314. Although there is much controversy over the permissibility of jury nullification, Paul
Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105
YALE L.J. 677, 701-05 (1995), I find no court or scholar who argues that nullification is
constitutionally permissible when based on discrimination against certain kinds of victims.
315. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 503 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring) (relying
on social science evidence to observe that some members of a minority group may themselves
engage in discrimination “to disassociate themselves from the group, even to the point of
adopting the majority’s negative attitudes towards the minority”).
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shows the relative value of diversity, it also proves that a diverse
jury does not guarantee an impartial one.316 Diversity and impartiality intertwine before they diverge, but they do diverge.
Those who would gamble with random selection express both
great optimism in the power of diversity, and also great cynicism in
the possibility of rooting out racism from the majority through
peremptory challenges.317 The value of peremptories depends
substantially on the forthrightness of potential jurors during voir
dire, as well as the ability of lawyers to make the right choices.318
Peremptory challenges allow lawyers to strike jurors who do not
articulate their own biases, but hint at them.319 But we do not train
law students in the social science relevant to jury selection, nor do
lawyers ever receive meaningful feedback on their choices.320 Even
the most experienced litigator learns only the resulting verdict of a
trial, nothing about the deliberations themselves, nor the viewpoints
of those they chose to strike.321
The value of peremptories is difficult to measure and has not been
the subject of significant empirical work.322 One of the most famous
316. See King, supra note 59, at 126-28 (suggesting that diversity does not guarantee
impartiality, and that lack of diversity does not necessarily thwart a correct verdict).
317. See Herman, supra note 11, at 1838 (arguing that even a perfect cross section of the
community would leave minority juries with a heavily majority white jury and serious
questions of bias).
318. See Johnson, supra note 195, at 1675.
319. See Howe, supra note 51, at 1194; Underwood, supra note 104, at 771. As Babcock
argued powerfully in her famous article defending peremptories, by being overinclusive,
peremptories allow judges to do the hard and possibly offensive work of determining bias with
greater specificity. Babcock, supra note 99, at 554-55.
320. See generally William R. Trail & William D. Underwood, The Decline of Professional
Legal Training and a Proposal for Its Revitalization in Professional Law Schools, 48 BAYLOR
L. REV. 201, 227 (1996) (noting the need for social science inclusion and practical skills training, such as selecting juries, in professional legal education).
321. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 737 (1993) (noting “the cardinal principle that
the deliberations of the jury shall remain private and secret”); Tetlow, supra note 2, at 103
(noting the harm the Supreme Court imposes on defendants unable to determine whether
their convictions were discriminatory due to the “black box” of jury deliberations). After the
Chicago Jury Project taped several deliberations in 1954 in its effort to gather information
about jury decision making, state legislatures responded to the “bugging” of juries by prohibiting the recording of deliberations; since then, actual deliberations have been taped only
once. Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, The American Jury at Twenty-Five Years, 16 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 323, 324-26 (1991); see also Marilyn Chandler Ford, The Role of Extralegal
Factors in Jury Verdicts, 11 JUST. SYS. J. 16, 33 (1986) (stating that nearly all states prohibit
observation of jury deliberations).
322. See Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the
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studies, now almost forty years old, compared jury verdicts with the
opinions of those struck by peremptories and asked to remain as
“shadow juries” to observe the trial.323 The study showed mixed
results. It found that most of the jurors struck with peremptories
would have voted the same way as the selected jurors, making
peremptories unnecessary, but also harmless.324 Scholars often point
to this aspect of the study as proof that peremptories are unimportant to seeking impartiality without noting that peremptories also
seem to do no damage.325 But Charles Ogletree points out a less
cited result of the Zeisel and Diamond study.326 In a few cases,
defense lawyers successfully used peremptory challenges in a way
that changed the verdict, resulting in acquittals.327 Peremptory
challenges most often do neither good nor harm, but sometimes
actually make all the difference in a case.
Would we be better off with random jury selection, policed only by
the trial judge for the most obvious examples of bias? It is incredibly
difficult to measure, but doing so puts all of our eggs in one basket.
I worry that we focus on diversity more because it satisfies our desire to have an impartial-looking jury than because we actually
believe there exists no better way to root out bias. Diversity provides a placebo that still fails to grapple with the discrimination of
the majority by tasking a few minority jurors with the role of
Jury, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1113 n.293 (1995) (noting the paucity of empirical studies focusing
on the effectiveness of peremptory strikes); see, e.g., Geoffrey P. Kramer et al., Pretrial
Publicity, Judicial Remedies, and Jury Bias, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 409 (1990); Paul V.
Olczak et al., Attorneys’ Lay Psychology and Its Effectiveness in Selecting Jurors: Three
Empirical Studies, 6 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 431 (1991); Glenn F. Ross, The Selection
of Jurors in the Higher Courts of Queensland, 15 AUSTL. PSYCHOLOGIST 351, 357 (1980); Hans
Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict:
An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 498-99 (1978).
323. Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 322, at 492-500.
324. Id. at 507.
325. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 83, at 203-04 (discussing that study as proof that
peremptories are not worth keeping, but not explaining why peremptories therefore cause any
harm); Paul H. Schwartz, Equal Protection in Jury Selection? The Implementation of Batson
v. Kentucky in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1533, 1577 (1991); Joshua E. Swift, Batson’s
Invidious Legacy: Discriminatory Juror Exclusion and the “Intuitive” Peremptory Challenge,
78 CORNELL L. REV. 336, 344 n.63 (1993).
326. Ogletree, supra note 109, at 1146.
327. Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 322, at 519 (“[C]ases in which peremptory challenges
have an important effect on the verdict occur with some frequency.”). These acquittals were
some of the few verdicts with which the trial judge disagreed. Ogletree, supra note 109, at
1146.
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persuading the majority out of their deeply held bias. And, in
general, it invites a greater extremism into jury deliberations which
we value for the ability of reasonable people to persuade each other.
Most of those who seek to end peremptory challenges recognize
the potential cost to impartiality and offer some substitute tools.
Many would end peremptories only for the state and preserve them
for the defendant.328 Others would increase the power of judges over
jury selection by expanding the for-cause challenge.329 And a few
have proposed releasing the jury’s unanimity requirement as a way
to work around the clearly biased jurors who will be more likely to
serve.330 Each of these proposals, however, comes with significant
costs.
1. Denying Peremptory Challenges Only to the State Ignores
Endemic Jury Discrimination Against Minority Victims
Some of the reformers most troubled by the trade-off between
impartiality and diversity would solve the problem by imposing that
cost only on the state.331 They argue that allowing defendants, but
not prosecutors, to exercise peremptory challenges would promote
diversity, maintain the defendant’s rights to strive for impartiality,
and come at an acceptable cost to the state. “[F]alse convictions are
worse than false acquittals.”332 Unlike the defendant, the State will

328. See infra Part III.A.1.
329. See infra Part III.A.2.
330. See infra Part III.A.3.
331. See Ogletree, supra note 109, at 1138-41; Note, Due Process Limits on Prosecutorial
Peremptory Challenges, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1014 (1989) (arguing that due process prohibits prosecutors from striking jurors for any reasons other than the type that would rise to
a for-cause challenge, and thus prosecutors should have no peremptory challenges); cf.
Massaro, supra note 33, at 560 (proposing to end peremptories only for the state despite the
problem of the “all-white jury [that] acquits a white defendant of a crime against a black
victim”).
332. Ogletree, supra note 109, at 1142. Professor Ogletree also makes the argument that
the issue must not be terribly compelling because it took the Supreme Court six years after
Batson to consider it. Id. at 1150. This ignores the fact that prosecutors cannot appeal acquittals, and could only raise the issue by raising a rare and difficult interlocutory appeal. Georgia
v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 50-52 (1992); see also J. Alexander Tanford, Racism in the
Adversary System: The Defendant’s Use of Peremptory Challenges, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1015,
1021-23 (1990) (describing the enormous difficulty in raising the issue of the defendant’s use
of peremptory challenges on appeal).
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not go to jail if it loses.333 Reformers argue that the State will have
many opportunities to catch the same guilty defendant or to enforce
other examples of a particular crime.334
One practical problem with the proposal is that ending peremptories for only one side would eliminate the benefits of random selection and the resulting fair cross section. The proposal would no
longer accomplish a jury more representative of the venire from
which it came. Instead, in the interest of protecting the defendant’s
right to root out bias against himself, he alone would have the right
to choose.
The bigger problem, however, is that reformers assume that
defendants would exercise peremptories to add minority representation.335 To an astonishing extent, they assert hypothetical defendants who are almost always black, despite the fact that a majority,
at least of federal criminal defendants, are white.336 With very rare
exception, reformers never grapple with the possibility of a white
defendant who might use his newfound privileges to strike black
jurors.337 Nor do they mention the existence of crime victims, who
are disproportionately black, nor the endemic problem of racial
discrimination against victims.338
333. Massaro, supra note 33, at 561.
334. Id. (arguing for eliminating only prosecutorial peremptories because “the state has
repeated opportunities to enforce the penal code and hence to protect society”).
335. See Francis, supra note 16, at 325-26 (noting the existence of nonminority defendants,
but strangely presuming that they would use peremptory challenges in a random or neutral
way).
336. As of March 2015, the Federal Bureau of Prisons lists 59.1 percent of federal prisoners
as white. Statistics: Inmate Race, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.bop.
gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_race.jsp [http://perma.cc/AGQ4-TN2K]. Given racial
sentencing disparities, white defendants are presumably far more numerous than prison statistics indicate because they serve shorter sentences on average.
337. Toni Massaro is one of the rare few to actually acknowledge the problem, but she
dismisses it as a necessary cost, and offensive more to the mere appearance of fairness. She
argues that any solution should focus on increasing the number of minorities in the venire
(without explaining how that would work to protect against racial skewing by the defendant,
though insufficient to protect against racial skewing by the state). Massaro, supra note 33,
at 560-61. Douglas Colbert attempted to grapple with the same problem by proposing a
provocatively creative solution. He makes a Thirteenth Amendment argument to withhold
peremptories from the defendant charged with a crime against a black victim. Colbert, supra
note 3, at 118. The problem, of course, is that the Court would never allow such a race-specific
solution.
338. Bureau of Justice statistics show that blacks are disproportionately the victims of
crime. JENNIFER TRUMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2012, at 7
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These proposals simply ignore, or gloss over, the fact that defendants also sometimes have motives to strike all minorities from
juries.339 This oversight is all the more startling because the
Supreme Court case applying the Batson rule to defendants, Georgia
v. McCollum, involved white defendants who sought to strike all of
the black jurors while on trial for a hate crime against black
victims.340 Those who would apply the Batson rule only to regulate
the state often cite Justice Marshall’s concurrence to Batson,
suggesting the need to end peremptory challenges, but they ignore
his warning that the prohibition should apply to both sides precisely
because the defendant could make use of peremptories to strike
minority jurors as well.341
As I have described at greater length elsewhere, discriminatory
acquittal, the flip side of the coin of discriminatory conviction,
constitutes a massive constitutional problem.342 Empirical research
has consistently shown that juries racially discriminate more
against the victims of crime than against defendants.343 Indeed, the
quintessential modern example of racist jury deliberations in our
popular discussion, and in many of these articles, is the Rodney
King trial.344 Yet no one seems to note the irony of allowing only the
police officers who beat Rodney King the ability to exercise peremptory challenges.345 We must create a rule that functions fairly,
whether the target of jury discrimination is the defendant or the alleged victim.

(2013). See generally Tetlow, supra note 2 (describing the long history of discriminatory
acquittal, from the trials of hate crimes to death penalty and rape conviction disparities based
on the race of the victim and noting lack of scholarly interest in the subject).
339. See Johnson, supra note 195, at 1616-17.
340. 505 U.S. 42, 44-45 (1992).
341. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107-08 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice
Marshall retired from the Court before it decided McCollum.
342. See Tetlow, supra note 2, at 103.
343. See Baldus et al., supra note 14, at 56; Johnson, supra note 169, at 71-72 (noting that
defendants sometimes seek to strike minority jurors); Tetlow, supra note 2, at 85-86.
344. See Baldus et al., supra note 14, at 21 n.40; Brand, supra note 14, at 514-16; Herman,
supra note 11, at 1810; Johnson, supra note 169, at 22; King, supra note 294, at 709; Marder,
supra note 88, at 1059; Muller, supra note 33, at 106; Ramirez, supra note 292, at 780; TaylorThompson, supra note 297, at 1315 n.317.
345. It is unclear in these articles whether the defendants who would retain peremptories
would also be bound by Batson and McCollum. Presumably not, because McCollum would
prohibit the use of peremptories for the purpose of protecting diversity.
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2. Strengthening For-Cause Challenges Gives the Power of Jury
Selection to the Judge
Most scholars who would end peremptories recognize and worry
about the resulting trade-off between protecting diversity and
striving for impartiality. They worry about how to eliminate, or
work around, the clearly biased juror who can no longer be struck
with a peremptory challenge. Most propose strengthening the
judge’s role in striking biased jurors for cause.
Increasing the power of the trial judge to exercise for-cause
strikes might help eliminate the most obviously biased jurors.346 The
current standard for such strikes is quite high: “whether the juror’s
views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his
duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.”347
Judges grant such causes reluctantly and rarely, after making every
effort to cure the expressed bias.348
Without peremptory challenges as a backstop, in theory judges
should rise to the challenge and understand the need to take on
increased responsibility for protecting the impartiality of the jury.349
Yet judges too often see the question of bias as an unequivocal
determination of impartiality. They hesitate to strike jurors because
it seems overly demeaning, a judicial declaration of unfitness.350
To solve this problem, some reformers would attempt to lower the
for-cause standard in order to make it meaningful. Charles Ogletree
proposes “any basis that would cause a reasonable attorney to be
confident that the challenged juror will be unable to render an
impartial verdict,” though that basis could not be based on “pure
hunch.”351 Albert Alschuler would reduce the standard further to
encompass “any juror whose ability or fairness appeared open to

346. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 83, at 207; Ogletree, supra note 109, at 1134-40.
347. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
348. See Howard, supra note 99, at 414-15 & n.230 (“Commentators have noted judicial
reluctance to grant challenges for cause. This may be particularly true in jurisdictions where
judges are subject to reelection ... [and] some judges engage in ‘aggressive rehabilitation,’
asking challenged jurors if they could set aside their experiences and feelings and follow the
judge’s orders.”).
349. Ogletree, supra note 109, at 1134.
350. See id.
351. Id.
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doubt.”352 He would specifically reassure judges that this would not
require a finding of partiality.353 This would certainly help. It would
replace an overly strangled definition of bias with a very broad,
albeit intensely subjective, one.
Herein lies the problem. Broadening for-cause challenges to make
them into a meaningful guard against juror bias also then gives
judges great power to select juries.354 Any individual’s perception of
whether a juror’s fairness appears “open to doubt” constitutes a
highly discretionary and overly powerful inquiry.355 It would impose
the judge’s own (often subconscious) bias onto jury selection.356 Not
only would the parties face the judge’s ideological bent in the
refereeing of the trial, but also in the composition of the jury.
In some ways, my Sixth Amendment test resembles a more
stringent for-cause standard. I would, after all, task judges with
weighing lawyers’ arguments about impartiality with a test similar
to that proposed by Ogletree and Alschuler for an easier for-cause
standard. Both systems would vest tremendous power in the judge
to make subjective calls. And of course actually ending peremptories
would have a far stronger impact on diversity, while still allowing
judges to police impartiality.
There is a big difference, however, in asking historically reluctant
judges to grant a strike (as in an expanded for cause challenge)
versus asking judges to veto a strike made by a party based on a
legal balancing test (as in my proposal). My proposed test puts the
power of inertia behind allowing strikes of potentially biased jurors.
There is also a difference between allowing both sides to participate in jury selection, with only the occasional obligation to explain
themselves when they have skewed diversity versus eliminating
peremptories altogether. In my proposed test, the parties will still
exercise their dueling slate of challenges and would have to explain
only the challenges that impact diversity. We would still harness
each side’s self-interest to root out bias through active participation
352. Alschuler, supra note 83, at 207.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 209 (acknowledging that judges would have increased power over jury selection
but that “[t]he danger of unconstitutional abuse posed by the exercise of peremptory
challenges by partisan advocates is probably greater”).
355. Id. at 208 (citing examples of difficult calls to make).
356. Id.
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in jury selection rather than relying entirely on the judge’s personal
and often cautious willingness to do so.
3. Relaxing Unanimity Disempowers the Biased Juror, but Also
Dilutes the Impact of Diversity
If ending peremptory challenges allows more biased jurors to be
seated, then perhaps we could solve the problem by allowing those
jurors to be outvoted. Indeed, although many note that England has
ended peremptory challenges, few notice that it relaxed the unanimity requirement at the same time.357 Albert Alschuler half-heartedly
proposes the possibility of relaxing the requirement of unanimous
verdicts to the constitutionally permissible limit of a two-thirds
vote.358 This would diminish the damage done by the occasional
“three dollar bill juror” (one who simply cannot be fair) who makes
his way onto a jury chosen without peremptory challenges.359 Akil
Amar would go even farther. He would eliminate almost all
pretenses at voir dire and for-cause challenges, and then have juries
rule by simple majority vote.360 Indeed, grand juries function this
way. They are large and inclusive, but govern by majority rule.361
Nonunanimous verdicts would help to split the difference between
the benefits of diversity and the costs of impartiality. By ending peremptories, we could make use of diversity to provide a fair cross
section on the petit jury, thus using diversity as a powerful tool to
optimize impartiality. Nonunanimous verdicts would then reduce
the power of jurors with strong bias, those who actively cannot be
fair.362

357. Bove, supra note 280, at 265.
358. Alschuler, supra note 83, at 207 & n.189 (making this proposal, but then admitting
in a footnote that he would not actually view such a change as progress).
359. Id. (suggesting the adoption of nonunanimous verdicts to make up for possibility of
a crazed “three dollar bill juror”).
360. Amar, supra note 280, at 1189-91.
361. See Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734, 1781 (2011)
(stating that grand juries typically function by majority rule). Federal grand juries require
twelve out of sixteen to twenty-three members to return an indictment. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a),
(f). Of course grand juries only indict, not convict, so the stakes are lower.
362. See Herman, supra note 11, at 1823 (defining strong and weak bias). There is no easy
way to measure the effectiveness of this fix because each jury pool will have a different number of “three dollar bill jurors” who make their way onto the jury, but it would certainly help.
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The problem is that this approach also would come at a significant cost both to our ideal of jury deliberations and to the actual
power of diversity.363 It would succeed in making partial jurors less
powerful, but it also would make minority jurors less powerful.364 In
effect, it might cancel out the impact of increased diversity. Minority
jurors could no longer simply act as holdouts against bias; in order
to hang a jury, they would need to persuade the rest of the group.365
Ultimately, each of the proposed reforms to radically reshape jury
selection comes at a significant cost. We could eliminate peremptories to protect diversity, but at an unknowable cost to an impartial
jury for the defendant. We could impose that cost only on the State
and put the power of jury selection in the hands of the defendant
alone, but this would sacrifice equal protection of the law for minority victims. We could improve impartiality by giving judges greater
power to exercise for-cause challenges, but at a cost to the nature of
a jury independent of the court and to whatever side did not share
the judge’s leanings. We could perhaps reduce the need for a unanimous verdict as a way around the new percentage of biased jurors
who slip through, but at a risk to our ideals of a deliberative process
and to the power of the very diversity we tried to promote. In the
quest for an impartial jury, none of these trade-offs seems worth
making.
B. The Defendant’s Right to an Impartial Jury Matters More than
the Democratic Role of Juries
The final argument for ending peremptory challenges contends
that diversity simply trumps impartiality as a constitutional value.
363. See ABRAMSON, supra note 35, at 179-205 (arguing that relaxing the unanimity
requirement guts the power of diversity and also our idea of jury deliberations); Alschuler,
supra note 83, at 207 n.189 (“Jury unanimity reinforces the sense that criminal convictions
manifest a high degree of certainty of guilt, a sense that furthers the criminal law’s ability to
fulfill its distinctive mission.” (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of Criminal Law, 23 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 402-06 (1958))).
364. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 396 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting
that under a majority rule regime “consideration of minority views may become nothing more
than a matter of majority grace”); ABRAMSON, supra note 35, at 179-205 (arguing that relaxing
the unanimity requirement guts the power of diversity and also our idea of jury deliberations).
See generally Taylor-Thompson, supra note 297, at 1274 (describing the impact of the growing
trend of nonunanimous verdicts on minority jury power).
365. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 297, at 1310.
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A system of random selection better protects the basic democratic
principle of citizen participation in juries without interference from
a process designed to weed out bias.366 For these reformers, diverse
juries are representative juries, capable of expressing popular will
and community consensus.367 Although I agree that the democratic
role of juries matters enormously, it cannot trump the defendant’s
right to an impartial jury. When jury verdicts become an exercise in
popular sovereignty, we lose sight of whether the verdicts are
correct. We celebrate the process without focusing on the results.
The Supreme Court has often described the jury system as selfgovernance.368 Citizens have a right of access to jury service similar
to their right to vote for the other branches.369 “Just as suffrage
ensures the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and executive
branches, [the] jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the
judiciary.”370 By fulfilling the “civic responsibility” of jury service,
citizens fill a particularly important role of guarding against the
“arbitrary power” of government.371 Juries create a buffer against
zealous prosecution by the executive branch or bad decision making
by the judiciary.372
In the Sixth Amendment cases, the Court described this principle not just in terms of governance and individual participation,
but also in terms of accurate representation of the public. Juries
should be chosen from a fair cross section of the community to protect “our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative

366. See Amar, supra note 280, at 1182; see also Alschuler, supra note 83, at 156-57
(arguing that peremptory challenges are undemocratic).
367. Amar, supra note 280, at 1182; see Forde-Mazrui, supra note 22, at 362.
368. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (“Jury service preserves the democratic
element of law.”).
369. Amar, supra note 123, at 204; Amar, supra note 280, at 1169.
370. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004).
371. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 495 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting). These
purposes include: “(1) ‘guard[ing] against the exercise of arbitrary power,’ ... (2) preserving
‘public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system,’ and (3) implementing our
belief that ‘sharing in the administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.’” Id.
(quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174-75 (1986)).
372. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (“The purpose of a jury is to guard
against the exercise of arbitrary power—to make available the commonsense judgment of the
community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to
the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge.”).
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government.”373 The Court did not focus on interest group politics so
much as creating a representative cross section of the public will.374
Ending peremptories, some reformers argue, would accomplish
this kind of representativeness on the trial jury, and not just in the
venire. More random selection would create juries that represent
the public, and thus express the popular will.375 This vision of
diversity focuses not just on suspect categories or interest group
voting, but also on representing the public in general.376
Some of those who would restructure juries make a bolder claim
about the nature of juries and democracy. They compare jury
selection to legislative districting, in which racial minorities have
rights against vote dilution.377 If African Americans do not get the
chance to serve on juries in proportion to their percentage in the
population, they argue, their power of self-governance through
juries is correspondingly diminished.378 Jury reform must recognize
the collective, rather than individual, rights of racial minorities to
prevent dilution of political power.379
373. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (“It is part of the established tradition in the
use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of
the community.”). To exclude racial groups from jury service was said to be “at war with our
basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.” Id.
374. Jeffrey Abramson argues that this shifted with Taylor v. Louisiana to a more interest
group vision of diversity. ABRAMSON, supra note 35, at 122-27.
375. See, e.g., Abramson, supra note 56, at 128 (explaining that a jury representative of the
views of society can fulfill its democratic role); Muller, supra note 33, at 137-48 (promoting
the vision of a representative jury without proposing an end to peremptory challenges).
376. See ABRAMSON, supra note 35, at 99-141 (describing the move from a general vision
of diversity, which he argues better promotes meaningful deliberations, to an interest group
vision of diversity).
377. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 22, at 369-71; Francis, supra note 16, at 353-56 (arguing
that because the Supreme Court allows race consciousness in legislative districting to prevent
vote dilution, the Court should allow efforts against racial vote dilution on juries).
378. See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 22, at 1112-17. Gerken argues that diversity violations
interfere with the opportunity for minorities to serve on juries in proportion to their
population. Id.
379. See Herman, supra note 11, at 1843. This would move far beyond current precedent.
The Court has not applied the Sixth Amendment to jury selection. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S.
474, 487-88 (1990). Batson relied in part on the idea that jurors should be chosen or not
without regard to race, holding that jurors have a right against racial stereotyping even in a
process built on stereotyping in general. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Yet this
individualized right—not to serve on a jury but to avoid not serving on a jury because of
race—does not express the collective nature of the injury. Indeed, Batson’s logic that race
should prove irrelevant to jury service would seem to preclude as unconstitutional any claims
of proportional representation.

2015]

SOLVING BATSON

1941

My worry is that the representative-jury argument elevates the
diversity of citizen participation over the constitutional guarantee
of impartiality.380 Although there are many similarities between
voting and jury service, they serve different purposes. We do not
strive to create an impartial electorate, but a representative one.381
When citizens vote in elections, we may disagree with the results,
but we do not deem them inaccurate in some abstract way.382 We
protect the process by which citizens get to vote, rather than police
the results of their voting.383
We are constitutionally required, however, to strive for an impartial jury that will come to the right answer.384 Equating juries to
elections projects a vision of the jury not as a functional group of
individuals carefully chosen for their ability to be fair, but as a
group chosen merely to express public opinion.385 Verdicts become
mere exercises of voter power rather than the best available mechanism to achieve correct verdicts in the criminal justice system.386
Here is another problem: juries are simply too small to be
properly representative of the public will.387 You would never trust
a political poll with a sample of twelve. Now imagine a system in
which we replaced elections with a randomly selected sample of
380. Gerken, supra note 22, at 1166 (arguing that the ideal of impartiality runs counter to
the goal of racially proportionate representation on juries).
381. See Abramson, supra note 56, at 127.
382. Id.
383. This is a distinction perhaps akin to the philosophical distinction between those who
would choose judges by electing them (for the sake of democracy) versus those who would
agonize over appointing qualified judges.
384. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See generally David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections,
108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 270-96 (2008).
385. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 123, at 204-06; John Gastil et al., Civic Awakening in the
Jury Room: A Test of the Connection Between Jury Deliberation and Political Participation,
64 J. POL. 585 (2002) (demonstrating that jurors who reached a verdict in criminal cases were
more likely to vote in subsequent elections than deadlocked, dismissed, or alternate jurors);
Muller, supra note 33, at 148 (“[J]uries, like legislatures, are a meeting place for the various
experiences and, in Justice Souter’s words, ‘sets of social values,’ of distinctive groups in the
community.”).
386. Some acknowledge the potential conflict between representativeness and impartiality
and propose a middle ground. Eric Muller argues that judges must balance between the
conflicting claims, and perhaps as a result, does not propose ending peremptory challenges.
Muller, supra note 33, at 144.
387. See JAMES S. FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND
PUBLIC CONSULTATION 18-20 (2009); Gerken, supra note 22, at 1112-13 (showing that random
assignment produces only a normal distribution curve, not individually diverse juries).
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twelve voters and trusted the results as representative. In recognition of this sampling problem, Heather Gerken proposes the idea of
“second-order diversity,” arguing that what matters is the diversity
of juries as a whole, on average, over time.388 She thus acknowledges
“the fact that different juries will render different verdicts in similar
cases,” but celebrates that as expressions of the people’s will:389
We worry about different juries rendering different verdicts
because we fear it is a sign that one of the juries was partial—in
the sense of biased. The notion of second-order diversity recasts
jury verdicts as partial in a different sense—as a fraction of the
whole. It suggests that a verdict is best understood as one data
point in figuring out what the “law” is or ought to be. And that
notion may be difficult to reconcile with our normative vision of
the role the jury ought to play.390

Gerken acknowledges the unfortunate toll this might take on
individual defendants or civil litigants, but hopes that some of the
sting can be removed by appellate review.391
Of course, appellate review of criminal appeals proves far from
meaningful.392 “Justice on average” will not suffice for the innocent
men and women who are convicted and spend years in prison, and
no appeal of inaccurate acquittals exists for the victims whose perpetrators go free because a biased jury has devalued them as black
or female.393
The logic of “justice on average” rests in part on the notion that
juries are not mere truth seekers, but exercise discretion, judgment,
and power. Those who argue for diversity as representation
characterize jury verdicts as a function of political compromise: “the
388. Gerken, supra note 22, at 1175.
389. Id. at 1165 (explaining that there is always a certain variation among jury verdicts);
id. at 1161-64 (discussing positive aspects of that variation).
390. Id. at 1166.
391. See id. at 1165 (“[C]onsistency matters, particularly to those most affected by the
decisions.”).
392. See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 2, at 1-13 (describing the reasons the innocent are
convicted and rarely exonerated).
393. Tetlow, supra note 2, at 91-95 (describing the history of acquittals of those who
committed racially oriented violence against black victims, the current empirical evidence
that juries tend to devalue black victims, and the evidence that juries put female victims of
gender-based violence on trial).
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products of life experience, subjective viewpoint, and value judgment.”394 If we believe that the potential verdicts in most trials could
be justified by mere philosophy, then we worry less about variation.
Verdicts requiring only policy judgments should function more like
elections. It is certainly true that jurors apply law to facts and thus
have a role in defining nebulous concepts such as “reasonableness,”
“imminent danger,” “causation,” and “state of mind.”395 Without delving into the permissibility of jury nullification, juries can come to a
variety of conclusions within the law that are still legally correct.396
Yet is there really such a large proportion of closely divided cases
in which either verdict is within the realm of justice? Many, if not
most, trials involve purely factual determinations of whether the
defendant or someone else committed a particular crime. Verdicts
that require the solving of a mystery should not function merely as
plebiscites. If the defendant is factually innocent, it is not within the
acceptable range of jury power to convict him. If the defendant is
guilty, an acquittal—particularly one based on race or gender
discrimination against the victim—can also cause serious harm.397
The decision of whether to send a person to jail or to release him
into the community cannot merely be an exercise in discretionary
power that we hope is generally correct over time.
Further, even the subjective application of law to facts holds the
possibility of deciding badly. Self-defense cases, for example, involve
the application of a subjective legal standard to facts.398 Yet too
often, they turn on a racialized determination of the risk posed by
the victims, be it an unarmed black teenager with a bag of Skittles
or four teenagers playing loud music.399 Similarly, a significant
394. See Muller, supra note 33, at 136 (comparing scientific verdicts with social verdicts).
395. See Darryl K. Brown, Plain Meaning, Practical Reason, and Culpability: Toward a
Theory of Jury Interpretation of Criminal Statutes, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1199, 1201-02 (1998).
396. See Howe, supra note 51, at 1182.
397. See Tetlow, supra note 2, at 81-95 (describing the long history of discriminatory
acquittals and arguing that they violate the Constitution).
398. Caroline Forell, What’s Reasonable? Self-Defense and Mistake in Criminal and Tort
Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1401, 1403-05 (2010) (describing the range of subjectivity
throughout jurisdictions); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the
Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293, 318-20 (2012) (describing the debate on the
reasonableness standard and its subjectivity).
399. See, e.g., Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 369 n.2 (1996) (defining stereotypes as “wellinternalized associations regarding groups of people that result in habitually automatic, gut-
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number of women incarcerated for murder failed in their selfdefense claims after killing men who beat them and threatened to
kill them.400 Juries famously judge these women through a prism of
gender discrimination.401 Even verdicts that represent policy judgments should not merely reflect popular opinion, but represent the
thoughtful, nondiscriminatory application of the law.
When jurors deliberate and come to a verdict, it matters whether
the results are correct.402 It is not enough to point to the power
exercised by a cross section of society to stand as a bulwark against
the government. It actually does matter, both to the defendant and
to the public, whether the jury comes to the correct result.403 Juries

level responses” (emphasis omitted)); Richardson & Goff, supra note 398 (analyzing the way
that subconscious biases influence mistaken judgments of criminality). For information on the
Trayvon Martin trial, see Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed., The Curious Case of Trayvon Martin, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2012, at A21; Ashley Hayes, Witnesses Tell FBI that George Zimmerman Is
No Racist, CNN (July 13, 2012, 7:44 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/12/ justice/florida-teenshooting/index.html [http://perma.cc/54TR-GREA]; Karen McVeigh, Trayvon Martin’s Death:
The Story So Far, GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2012, 5:53 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/
mar/20/trayvon-martin-death-story-so-far [http://perma.cc/MP47-VTDP]; and Trayvon Martin
Case (George Zimmerman), N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/
people/m/trayvon_martin/index.html [http://perma.cc/JU8W-KB4N] (last visited Apr. 6, 2015).
400. See CHARLES PATRICK EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL SELFDEFENSE AS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 41-50 (1987); ELIZABETH DERMODY LEONARD, CONVICTED
SURVIVORS: THE IMPRISONMENT OF BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL 103-14 (2002). See generally
Mira Mihajlovich, Comment, Does Plight Make Right: The Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert
Testimony and the Law of Self-Defense, 62 IND. L.J. 1253, 1257-59 (1987) (describing development of the battered woman syndrome).
401. See generally ROBBIN S. OGLE & SUSAN JACOBS, SELF-DEFENSE AND BATTERED WOMEN
WHO KILL: A NEW FRAMEWORK 1-7 (2002); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing:
Women’s Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 14 WOMEN’S
RTS. L. REP. 213 (1992); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Resistance to Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. REV.
477, 477-78 (1996); Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 237, 269-72 (2008).
402. Justice Souter made this point in dissent to a legislative districting case when
distinguishing the application of Batson, though he overstates the objective neutrality of all
verdicts. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1051 n.5 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Politics includes
choices between different sets of social values, choices that may ultimately turn on the ability
of a particular group to enforce its demands through the ballot box. Jury decision making is
defined as a neutral process, the impartial application of law to a set of objectively discovered
facts. To require racial balance in jury selection would risk redefining the jury’s role.”).
403. Re, supra note 49, at 1579 (“The jury is unique among governmental institutions in
that its legitimacy hinges almost exclusively on impartiality as opposed to accountability.”).
Given that we do not have real standards for juror competence, nor do we record or review
jury deliberations, it matters enormously to protect juror impartiality. Id.
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do fulfill an important part of democracy, but they fulfill an even
more important functional role within the criminal justice system.
Instead of correct verdicts, the jury-as-democracy proponents
focus on legitimate verdicts, made so by juries that represent the
public. Diverse juries better protect public confidence in the jury
system and the acceptance of verdicts as legitimate.404 And it is
certainly true that jury diversity has become a measure of fairness
in the popular imagination: the more diverse the jury, the more
likely a controversial verdict is to be accepted.405
Arguments about public legitimacy matter when they correspond
to justice, but they cannot trump it. When a diverse jury comes to a
defensible verdict in a tough case, diversity may add to the legitimacy of that verdict. When a diverse jury comes to an indefensible
verdict, however, the public will still complain. We cannot supplant
the ultimate goal of selecting an impartial jury with a goal of
choosing a jury that looks impartial because it is diverse.406 We
cannot elevate the appearance of propriety over actual propriety.
IV. CONCLUSION
Juries made up of mere mortals will continue to amaze us with
their courage and independence, and then disappoint us with their
bias and discrimination. We value juries, but we distrust them with
good reason. We struggle to make use of the wisdom of citizens
without importing the prejudice endemic in our culture, the racism
and sexism that has poisoned centuries of verdicts, or even just the
simple human bias that distorts our judgment.
The test I propose, like many legal standards, would be subjective
and messy. It represents a compromise and thus would never fully
satisfy anyone. It would vary in its results because judges would
differ in how actively they policed jury diversity and how carefully
they protected lawyers’ concerns about individual impartiality. But
it would at least focus on the right goals.
404. See Amar, supra note 280, at 1182; Forde-Mazrui, supra note 22, at 362.
405. King, supra note 274, at 1186-90 (surveying empirical evidence for this claim).
406. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial Court Judges, 73 CHI.KENT L. REV. 475, 485 (1998) (“I think it intuitively obvious that in the context of a criminal
trial, fairness to the defendant is more morally compelling than is creating an appearance of
neutrality among jurors.”).
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The current Batson rule constitutes a placebo that purports to
solve the problem of discrimination by juries but really focuses only
on purported discrimination against jurors. Not only does it fail to
address the real issues, it also actively distracts from them. The
Batson rule represents the culmination of the Supreme Court’s desire to solve the intractable and unconscionable problem of racism
in our criminal justice system by ordering everyone in the courtroom
to ignore it.
We need to turn our focus back to discrimination by jurors rather
than discrimination against them. We need to strive for jurors who
are impartial, not because they lack any human subjectivity or bias,
but because they are willing to listen, deliberate, and try hard to be
fair. We need to harness the tool of diversity to enrich deliberations
and to do battle with racism. In our quest for a jury that is in fact
fair, however, we cannot settle for a jury that looks fair only because
it is diverse. We need to focus on the importance of just verdicts and
not be distracted by public perceptions. Nor can we be distracted by
the democratic role of juries in merely reflecting the will of the people, no matter how flawed. We cannot settle for justice on average.

